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State weakness is a critical factor constraining development in all poorly performing 
developing countries and is particularly evident in Africa. The recent concern with 
accelerating African economic development has raised once again in a very powerful 
way the question of the governance reform priorities for Africa. Economists 
addressing this question have broadly divided into two camps. On the one hand is the 
very influential argument coming from Jeffrey Sachs and his associates (Sachs, et al. 
2004), which argues that the specific characteristics of Africa in terms of low 
population density, vast areas, poor infrastructure and the prevalence of difficult 
diseases makes many of the conventional governance arguments irrelevant. What 
Africa requires, according to this argument is a “big push” in terms of massive 
investment in infrastructure and disease control before attention to governance can 
have any meaning. On the other hand, the mainstream opinion as expressed for 
instance in the Commission for Africa (2005), argues that conventional concerns with 
corruption, accountability and rule of law are critical for improving the capacity of 
African states to deliver to their people. According to this view, these governance 
reforms are a precondition for the proper use of greater inflows of aid and investment. 
 
Both these positions have an element of truth, but they miss much that is very 
important. Sachs is certainly right in saying that Africa needs a big push in the form 
of a massive injection of funds, though the political will in advanced countries to fund 
such a programme is still far from evident. Moreover, Sachs is right in arguing that 
many of the governance objectives identified in the standard reform agenda, such as 
significant reductions in corruption and improvements in accountability are very 
likely to be unattainable in the short to medium term. Nevertheless, the downplaying 
of all governance capacities is not convincing given that African states will have to 
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play a critical role both in ensuring the productive deployment of development funds, 
but also, and more critically, in ensuring that the takeoff that these investments induce 
is a long-term and sustainable one. Thus, while Sachs may be right in implicitly 
rejecting the good governance agenda, there are alternative governance requirements 
that we need to identify.  
 
On the other hand, the governance capacities identified in the mainstream reform 
agenda such as that of the Commission for Africa also raise significant questions 
about their relevance and sequencing. The evidence that these good governance 
characteristics are a precondition for development is very weak. In the East Asian 
tiger economies, governance structures did not correspond to the requirements of the 
good governance model (Khan 2004a, 2005b). Levels of corruption were often very 
high during the early period of rapid economic growth and poverty reduction, 
property rights were not stable in critical respects, the rule of law was far from 
satisfactory, and accountability was often far removed from the democratic ideal. Yet 
states in these successful economies had other critical governance capacities that 
allowed them to sustain high levels of investment, and to absorb and learn the use of 
advanced technologies rapidly.  
 
The implications of these observations for DFID’s overall governance agenda are 
explored in our review of DFID’s governance TSP and this document will draw on 
the argument developed in that review (Khan 2005b). African states are often starting 
with lower initial capacities and often much less extensive states than the more 
successful countries in Asia. For instance, in Africa, civil servants constitute an 
average of 1% of the population, compared to 3% in other developing country areas, 
and their training is often poorer. While the capacity of the average state in Africa is 
undoubtedly lower than the Asian average, nevertheless they have much to learn from 
the Asian examples in terms of the directions in which they need to develop their state 
capacities for accelerated development. The Asian example tells us that the 
governance capabilities critical for development are those necessary for the rapid 
transformation of productive capacities. Unfortunately, the conventional governance 
approach that focuses primarily on transparency and accountability to ensure efficient 
pro-poor service delivery by the state tends to ignore these critical state capacities. 
The focus on a particular type of corruption in conventional anti-corruption strategies 
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is closely linked to a particular economic analysis of the state that argues that a state 
that enables efficient markets is sufficient for accelerating development in poor 
countries. In Part A, this paper we develop some of these general points that are 
relevant for the wider African context by showing how anti-corruption analysis is 
closely linked to an analysis of state failure and the critical areas in which state 
capacities need to be developed. The state has to play many other functions besides 
maintaining tolerably efficient markets, and consequently there are different types and 
drivers of corruption in developing countries. This understanding is critical for 
devising effective and achievable anti-corruption policies in developing countries. In 
Part B we illustrate these observations with reference to evidence from Tanzania. We 
summarize our main conclusions below. 
 
Conclusions and Implications for Anti-Corruption Policy in Africa. 
 
i) Corruption refers to all types of illegal activities that benefit public officials. 
However, while corruption itself is always damaging (because it is an illegal tax), the 
underlying state activities with which the corruption is associated can be either legal 
or illegal, and may be socially beneficial or damaging. This insight allows us to 
distinguish between four different types of corruption, with very different policy 
responses that are appropriate for tackling them.  
 
ii) For effective policy, we need to distinguish between these different types of 
corruption and prioritize attention on the most damaging types. Most anti-corruption 
policies target a type of corruption that is associated with legal but socially damaging 
state interventions that restrict markets. This market-restricting type of corruption is 
an important constraint on development but we argue it is not the most serious type of 
corruption facing developing countries. Moreover, an excessive focus on this type of 
corruption can have undesirable if unintentional effects. A second type of corruption 
constrains beneficial state interventions because it is associated with legal and 
potentially beneficial state activities. This state-constraining corruption is damaging, 
but the policy response has to be very different. We need to focus on how to enhance 
state capacities, even if we cannot get rid of all of the associated corruption 
immediately. A third type of corruption is political and structural in nature and is not 
amenable to standard policy measures at all. The drivers of these types of corruption 
in developing countries are poor fiscal capacity and the low productivity of productive 
assets. In this context, transfers through patron-client networks are a major 
mechanism for maintaining social order and these generate political corruption. Low 
productivity assets are difficult to protect because they do not generate enough 
income to pay for their protection and this leads to non-market processes of asset 
‘protection’ and ‘transfer’ that we describe as primitive accumulation. While the 
corruption associated with these problems is undesirable and deserves to be rooted out 
(like all types of corruption), these types of corruption are difficult to remove till the 
economy has already made considerable progress. But it is important to identify the 
sources and manifestations of these types of corruption to ensure that we do not waste 
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anti-corruption efforts on unattainable goals that only serve to disappoint and 
dishearten policy-makers. The fourth type of corruption is predatory corruption. This 
is possibly the most serious variant and here too, conventional anti-corruption policy 
measures are inappropriate. Here corruption is directly associated with state weakness 
or even impending state collapse and has to be tackled by addressing the (difficult) 
political and institutional issues that allow states to exercise a monopoly of legitimate 
violence. 
 
iii) We discussed the danger of focusing only on market-enabling state capacities and 
the associated market-restricting corruption in our review of DFID’s governance TSP 
(Khan 2005b). We argued there that in developing countries market transaction costs 
are likely to remain high because of structural factors that conventional economic and 
governance policies cannot address. As a result, we cannot rely on markets alone to 
allocate resources efficiently, particularly (and paradoxically) in poor countries with 
weak states. In fact, rapidly growing developing countries have had institutions and 
regulatory capacities that complemented the market by accelerating the transfer of 
resources to emerging capitalists, assisting them in technology acquisition and 
disciplining failure by ensuring that assets and resources were effectively re-allocated. 
And they did this while using non-market transfers to maintain political stability, 
often using unconventional patron-client networks. 
 
iv) The policy focus on market-restricting corruption in Africa, and the susceptibility 
of African countries to policy agendas set by donors has come about as a result of the 
failure of statist and interventionist policies followed by most African countries in the 
1960s and 1970s. These policies failed because African countries by and large did not 
succeed in developing state capacities for managing the social transformations that 
they attempted. The specific policies and strategies were often misguided and doomed 
to fail, particularly given the limited attention given to developing a viable capitalist 
sector and the attempt in many countries to construct socialism in very poor countries. 
We can find evidence of such policies in Tanzania too. However, it is dangerous to 
write off ‘socialist’ strategies in developing countries in their entirety as they did 
perform some functions that a successful transformation strategy must have. In 
Tanzania, the high level of social cohesion and comparative inter-tribal and inter-
communal peace is traceable to policies of nation building followed by the pre-
liberalization regimes. The loss of these capacities is likely to damage the cohesion 
achieved.  
 
v) While state-led African strategies by and large failed in the past, many Asian 
countries achieved spectacular success because their states focused on pro-actively 
accelerating the growth of a viable private sector. Instead of learning from the Asian 
experience and adapting this to African initial conditions, the new policy assumes that 
trade opportunities and open capital markets will be sufficient to drive growth in 
Africa. If so, the removal of market restrictions is the obvious priority. This 
expectation has directed attention away from how Africa can rapidly develop broad-
based capacities to produce, without which trading opportunities are at best likely to 
yield growth in low-productivity sectors in intense competition with other low-wage 
countries. 
 
vi) Some resource-rich African countries (like Tanzania) have temporarily benefited 
from liberalization as a result of extractive industry multinationals coming into 
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specific sectors, but this too is unlikely to lead to broad-based national development. 
Donors are aware that extractive industry investment is not necessarily developmental 
but the response has been to hope that greater transparency in this area will be 
sufficient to achieve developmental outcomes in the future. In fact, even the 
achievement of significantly greater transparency is unlikely in the near future. The 
scramble for natural resources is likely to intensify in the coming decades, with 
Chinese and eventually Indian resource companies entering Africa as major players 
and adding to the already great competitive pressures and political compromises 
involved in natural resource extraction. Realistically, the international governance of 
resource companies is unlikely to achieve significant results in this context. A rapid 
development of state capacities to use natural resource rents for national development 
is required in African countries like Tanzania if these resources are not to be 
squandered. Tanzania is a relevant case where the expectation that open markets and 
an enabling state are sufficient for ensuring investment and development has led to 
missed opportunities in the exploitation of its reserves of gold and other minerals for 
broad-based national development. 
 
vii) If these critical developmental governance capacities are important, the focus of 
anti-corruption policy should shift to prioritizing the reduction of damaging 
corruption in these areas but without setting an unattainable zero-corruption goal. If 
zero corruption becomes the goal of governance policy, state activities and capacities 
could be inadvertently restricted to a relatively small range of service delivery tasks 
that external donors spend all their time monitoring. This can have serious effects on 
the prospects of development, as we are likely to ignore the development of the 
critical state capacities required for accelerating the development of productive 
capacity.  
 
viii) Developing transformational state capacities has risks. Occasionally there will be 
mistakes, and more seriously, successful development in developing countries will 
empower groups and classes that are not the poorest in society. These groups are 
unattractive from the perspective of donor agencies. It is much easier to develop 
public support in donor countries for redistributing to the poor than for developing 
state capacities that will accelerate the emergence of productive capitalists 
(particularly in a context where some corruption exists). But if we are serious about 
development, there is no alternative to creating national capacities for competing in 
international markets. This is the lesson Africa should learn from the experiences of 
successful developers of East Asia.  
 
ix) Many African countries appear to suffer more seriously from the most damaging 
types of predatory corruption. This directs our attention to what Chabal and Daloz 
(1999) describe as the ‘institutionalization of disorder’ in Africa. Why does this 
happen, and why does it appear to happen to a greater extent in Africa? We argue that 
culture or purely institutional explanations do not take us very far. Understanding 
state weakness in Africa requires going back to the political history of colonial times 
and even earlier. State weakness has deep historical roots and we cannot address these 
problems using conventional anti-corruption policy. There is no alternative to 
painstakingly improving the capacity of states to maintain order and accelerate the 
creation of productive capacity.  
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x) Governance advisors focusing on anti-corruption can play a useful role by using 
corruption as a lens through which to analyse areas of critical state weakness in 
particular countries, and joining up this analysis with other governance activities that 
seek to develop critical state capacities to accelerate development. This approach can 
set achievable targets for anti-corruption policy by identifying the most damaging 
corruption bottlenecks that are impeding development, while joining up corruption 
analysis with a broader analysis of the institutional and political constraints facing 
economic development.  
 
xi) The Asian experience tells us that while rapidly growing countries did not have the 
most damaging types of corruption, no developing country managed to remove 
corruption across the board at early stages of development.  
 
 
Part A is organized as follows. Section A.1 very briefly summarizes the argument 
presented in our review of DFID’s Governance TSP and reminds us of the lack of 
statistical fit between good governance and economic performance in high-growth 
economies at early stages of their development. Section A.2 takes a closer look at the 
drivers of corruption in developing countries, developing our framework 
distinguishing between four types of corruption. Section A.3 summarizes the 
implications of our survey for governance policy in Africa. Part B is a detailed study 
of Tanzania, using this framework to identify critical areas of concern.  
 
 
Part A 
 
A.1 Corruption, Property Right Stability and Rule of Law in the Good 
Governance Approach. 
The policy recommendations of the good governance analysis are well known. The 
argument is that economic development in poor countries requires a significant 
reduction of corruption, stable property rights and a rule of law. These objectives are 
not just desirable in themselves; the good governance analysis tells us they are also 
necessary for development. The implicit argument here is that well-working markets 
require low transaction costs and transaction costs are lowered if corruption is low, 
property rights are stable and there is a good rule of law enforcing contracts.  
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There are at least three essential problems with this view of market-led development. 
First, while the theory is plausible, there is a chicken and egg problem when we try to 
understand how these governance reforms are to be achieved in poor countries. Each 
of these goals, the reduction of corruption, the achievement of stable property rights 
and of an effective rule of law requires significant expenditures of public resources 
and significant fiscal space. Poor economies do not have these resources and requiring 
them to achieve these goals before economic development takes off is the chicken and 
egg problem referred to above (Khan 2005b). It is not surprising that developing 
countries do not generally satisfy the good governance criteria at early stages of 
development even in the high-growth cases. Nevertheless, the high-growth countries 
had specific governance capacities that allowed their states to promote development 
in these contexts.  
 
Secondly, the good governance approach assumes that efficient markets are sufficient 
to ensure rapid development in developing countries. We have already argued that 
efficient markets are expensive institutions that are unlikely to be effectively 
established in developing countries. For this reason, historically, much of the asset 
and resource re-allocations necessary for accelerating development in developing 
countries have often taken place through non-market processes. Markets are 
obviously important, but at early stages of development, states also need to have 
institutional and political capacities to ensure that the non-market asset and property 
right restructuring that is inevitable at this stage is growth-enhancing, and does not 
descend into predatory expropriation or generate intolerable injustices and conflicts.  
 
Last but not least, growth in developing countries requires catching up through the 
acquisition of new technologies and learning to use these new technologies rapidly. 
Trying to construct efficient markets to attract capital and technologies in the way 
prescribed by most economists runs into the chicken and egg problem described 
above but also faces significant market failures to do with the organization of learning 
and overcoming low productivity that can only be overcome through learning-by-
doing (Khan 2000a). Attracting capital and technology that allows rapid 
improvements in technology requires state action to compensate for current low levels 
of productivity. Successful developers had states that could provide these incentives 
through different types of interventions that created what economists call rents, but 
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they also had the institutional and political capacity to manage these rents and to 
withdraw them when performance was poor. The interventions in question include a 
wide range of explicit or hidden subsidies for investors in sectors where current 
productivity was low but where future productivity promised to be high, including 
through such mechanisms as infrastructure prioritization, tax breaks, subsidies for 
training schemes, subsidized credit, technology licensing, and so on. These capacities 
are so important that we argue that they have to be developed even in very 
unpromising circumstances.  
 
State capacities that potentially enhance growth can also have costs. These capacities 
and regulatory roles increase the chances of corruption and other forms of rent 
seeking. But these costs have to be set against the possible gains, and even more so, 
against the possibility that without these state capacities sustainable development may 
not be possible. The argument that is often made is that East Asian developers had 
strong state capacities that allowed their states to intervene in these ways, but that 
other states with weaker capacities can make things worse by intervening. This 
plausible argument needs to be challenged. Weaker states that are catching up from a 
less favourable position may indeed not be able to do many of the types of things that 
states in East Asia could do, but there is little evidence that any nation developed 
without significant state capacities in supporting the different aspects of the economic 
transition described above. Our argument on these necessary transformative 
capabilities of the state has been developed in greater detail in (Khan 2004a, 2004b, 
2005c, 2005b) and our subsequent argument will develop this argument in the context 
of the weakness of African states and the implications for anti-corruption policies in 
particular.  
 
A.2 Drivers of Corruption in Developing Countries. 
The brief discussion earlier suggests that there are different types of interventions that 
states in developing countries carry out. Interventions in this context simply refers to 
what states do, they do not refer only to deliberate and planned policy interventions 
that have a specific goal such as the correction of market failures. In our review of 
DFID’s Governance TSP (Khan 2005b), we distinguished between four types of 
corruption associated with different “interventions”, depending on whether the 
intervention with which the corruption was associated was itself damaging or 
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beneficial, and whether that underlying “intervention” was legal or illegal to begin 
with. As a matter of definition, beneficial state activities and interventions work by 
creating beneficial “rents”, while damaging activities create damaging rents (see Box 
1 for some definitions).  
 
Box 1. Interventions, Rents and Corruption  
 
Rents have various definitions in economics but for our purposes, rents are 
incomes that are created by state interventions. For instance, the profits of 
monopolists whose monopoly rights are created or protected by the state, 
the incomes of natural resource owners whose ownership rights have been 
created by the state, of owners of technology and information whose rights 
are protected by states, of subsidy recipients of different types, are all rents. 
All state intervention creates rents by definition. Thus tracking rents allows 
us to track the beneficiaries of state interventions as well as to use 
economic theory to ask if the intervention is socially beneficial or just 
beneficial for the rent recipient. Clearly, not all rents are socially damaging, 
which is another way of saying that many state activities are beneficial not 
just to those directly benefiting from the extra incomes (or rents) but for 
society as a whole. 
 
The presence of rents motivates individuals to engage in rent seeking to 
capture the potential rents for themselves. Rent seeking is all activity that 
seeks to create, capture or re-allocate rents. Rent seeking is always a social 
cost because resources and time are used up that could otherwise have 
gone into production. But the net effect of rent seeking can be positive if the 
rents created or protected are very beneficial. Rent seeking can also be 
damaging if the rents created are socially damaging or if the amount of rent 
seeking is very high, wiping out the potential benefits of useful rents.  
 
Corruption is a type of illegal rent seeking, where public officials break the 
law for their personal benefit. It is rent seeking because somebody (in the 
public or private sector) is spending resources (in the form of bribes, 
creating political factions or in other forms) to capture a rent, or to avoid the 
extraction of a rent. The economic effect of the corruption thus depends on 
exactly the same considerations as with legal rent seeking: how big is the 
rent seeking cost, and what was the underlying rent that was created, 
distorted, transferred or wiped out? In Figure 1, different types of corruption 
are classified in terms of whether the rent/intervention with which corruption 
is associated was socially beneficial or damaging, and whether the 
intervention was legal or illegal. The underlying rent should not be confused 
with the associated rent seeking or corruption, since corruption is always 
illegal and the resources used up (say in bribes) are always a cost.  
 
For further reading see Khan (2000a; 2000b). 
 
The four-fold classification of corruption in terms of the type of intervention or rent it 
is associated with is shown in Figure 1. This is followed by a discussion of each type 
of corruption, the drivers of each type, and the policy implications for a reform 
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strategy that seeks to enhance pro-poor growth outcomes in developing country and 
specifically African contexts. 
 
Legal Interventions Illegal Interventions
Potentially
Beneficial 
Interventions
Damaging 
Interventions
2) State-Constraining Corruption.
Net effect can be beneficial or damaging 
depending on how seriously corruption 
subverts interventions.
Policy should seek to legalize rent seeking 
and strengthen state to prevent subversion of 
desirable interventions.
3) Political Corruption and Primitive 
Accumulation.
Net effect depends on stability achieved and 
whether a productive sector emerges.
Policy should seek to increase fiscal capacity 
for legal political stabilization and legal 
property right protection.
1) Market-Restricting Corruption.
Net effect of intervention always negative. 
Anti-corruption policy should remove these 
state capacities through liberalization and 
privatization.
4) Predation/Theft.
Net effect always negative: possible descent 
into warlordism.
Anti-corruption policy has to strengthen 
centralized coercive power of the state.
 
Figure 1 Four Types of Corruption in Developing Countries 
 
 1) Market-Restricting Corruption. The type of corruption most often 
discussed in the policy literature on corruption is market-restricting corruption. 
Mainstream or neoclassical economics mainly focuses on this type of corruption. This 
corruption is associated with rents/interventions which are formally legal but which 
reduce the efficiency of markets. The neoclassical policy literature assumes that most 
state activities create artificial restrictions in market economies, which create socially 
damaging rents for small groups of beneficiaries of these rents but damage the 
economy as a whole. It is often assumed that corruption in developing countries is 
primarily of this type.  
 
Rents/interventions that are legal but socially damaging because they restrict the 
operation of markets are usually relatively easily to identify. These include the 
imposition of unnecessary red tape that creates jobs in bureaucracies but does not 
contribute to any necessary regulation of markets; damaging restrictions on trade and 
investment that create monopoly rents for a few traders or investors without any 
immediate or eventual social benefit, and so on. From a policy perspective, these 
interventions are relatively easily to identify because they are legal and therefore 
clearly visible and they restrict the operation of markets in ways that cannot be 
justified in terms of regulation or social need. These damaging interventions 
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inevitably create rents for some individuals even though society as a whole is worse 
off. But in these cases rent seeking in the form of corruption adds to the social cost 
because the loss of additional resources in the form of bribes and other rent-seeking 
costs increases the social cost of these interventions.  
 
Here the driver of corruption is the (damaging) interventionist capacity of the state to 
restrict markets, together with the relatively low opportunity cost of corruption for 
most public officials in developing countries, which allows them to engage in 
corruption with impunity. The low opportunity cost of corruption is due to three 
interrelated factors. First, the low salaries of public officials mean they stand to lose 
very little if they lose their jobs for being corrupt or for any other reason. Secondly, 
the lack of transparency and accountability means that in any case they face a very 
low probability of detection in the first place. Finally, even when detected, the 
ineffective justice system means there is a low probability of successful prosecution 
and loss of employment. Together, these factors conspire to ensure that public 
officials have little disincentive when deciding to restrict markets to create damaging 
rents or to collect bribes when individuals in society seek to capture these rents or 
avoid the restrictions created. The drivers of market-restricting corruption have been 
extensively analysed by mainstream economists and are shown in Figure 2. 
 
The net effect of market-restricting corruption is always negative because the 
interventions create damaging rents (through restrictions on markets) and the illegal 
rent seeking in the form of bribes and corruption as individuals seek to capture the 
rents or work their way around the useless restrictions uses up more resources. The 
total effect is a dual negative effect, consisting of the negative effect of the restrictions 
and the negative effect of the resources lost in the rent seeking in the form of bribes, 
lost time and effort and so on. The policy response to corruption in developing 
countries follows largely from this analysis, as do the usual policy instruments for 
dealing with corruption.  
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Low Opportunity Cost of Corruption
Incentives of Officials to Illegally Ration Rents or 
Remove Obstacles in Exchange for Bribes
Interventionist State Policies
Formal/Legal State Capacities to Create 
(Damaging) Rents and Restrictions in Markets
Creation of harmful rents 
and restrictions
Loss of investible 
resources in bribes
+
Intervention and the associated 
corruption have a dual negative effect  
Figure 2 Drivers of Market-Restricting Corruption 
 
 
Box 2 Rents/Interventions Associated with Market-Restricting Corruption  
 
Examples of rents and state activities that are legal and restrict markets in 
socially damaging ways:  
Red tape and regulation that serves no desirable social or regulatory function. 
Subsidies for privileged groups that serve no growth or welfare function.  
 
Associated corruption: 
Bribes to bypass useless red tape 
Bribes to capture privileged subsidies 
 
Policy responses:  
Remove damaging state activities and rents  
Increase cost of corruption for public officials through transparency, legal 
sanctions and higher salaries 
 
Mainstream economic policy analysis suggests the need to attack both of the key 
drivers of this type of corruption. The attack on the interventionist capacities of the 
state for damaging interventions takes place through privatization and liberalization, 
while the response to the low opportunity cost of corruption is higher public sector 
salaries, greater transparency, greater accountability and improvements in the 
efficiency of the judicial system. These recommendations are well known. However, 
despite over a decade of effort, policies focusing on these drivers have little success to 
report. This is because this type of corruption is not the only type afflicting 
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developing countries, and it may not even be the most important variant of corruption 
in these countries. 
 
 2) State-Constraining Corruption. Much more serious in terms of 
consequences is the corruption associated with legal and potentially beneficial state 
interventions. Here, the intervention and the associated rent created by the state are 
beneficial for the individuals capturing it as well as for society as a whole. Examples 
of these types of rents and interventions include subsidies for technology acquisition, 
natural resource rents that enable optimal rates of extraction of exhaustible resources, 
subsidies for learning in emerging industries, interventions that protect technology 
rents, and so on. As with all rents, the existence or potential existence of these rents 
induces rent-seeking behaviour, which may include corruption in a developing 
country context. This type of corruption constrains state intervention to varying 
extents. The corruption could constrain the quality of intervention to a small degree in 
which case the intervention remains beneficial though constrained. But it can also 
constrain it to the extent that the intervention becomes harmful. The critical question 
here is thus the extent to which corruption affects the implementation of the 
intervention. We call these types of corruption state-constraining corruption. 
 
The distinctive feature of this type of corruption is that here state activity creates 
potentially beneficial rents and the corruption is associated with these interventions. If 
we want these state activities to continue, we have to be willing to tolerate some 
amount of rent seeking around these rents. As all state intervention creates rents, the 
state can never intervene without inducing some rent seeking. It is important to 
remember that rent seeking around state interventions is widespread in advanced 
countries; the only difference is that in advanced countries, much of the rent seeking 
around necessary and legal state interventions is also legal, and can therefore be 
regulated. Corruption in contrast is rent seeking that is illegal and is therefore difficult 
to regulate. The limited legitimacy of those who have acquired money in developing 
countries makes it difficult to legalize with immediate effect all of the rent seeking 
associated with necessary and beneficial state interventions. Nevertheless, the long-
term objective here must be to convert illegal rent seeking into legal rent seeking, and 
to regulate this rent seeking properly so that the damage to potentially beneficial state 
intervention is limited.  
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 In the short run, the outcome of state-constraining corruption depends on whether the 
corruption and rent seeking subverts the implementation of the policy so seriously that 
it is no longer socially beneficial, and on the extent of the resource loss due to bribes 
and other rent-seeking costs. Figure 3 summarizes two different levels at which 
politics and institutions determine the outcomes of state-constraining rent 
seeking/corruption. First, political and institutional conditions determine the types of 
beneficial rents that states attempt to implement. The stability of some regimes and 
the political imperatives of their leaders are more conducive for beneficial 
interventions than other regimes. We do not yet fully understand where the political 
imperatives for growth-enhancing interventions come from, but we can observe some 
interesting patterns. Secondly, politics and institutions also determine the extent and 
implications of the associated rent seeking/corruption, and whether the latter subverts 
the implementation of the intervention, turning the intervention into a value-reducing 
intervention.  
 
Corruption / legal rent seeking
appears as a “malign” process
that protects inefficiency (most
developing countries)
Failed Implementation
Benefit of Rent minus
Rent-Seeking Cost is Negative
Corruption / legal rent-seeking
appears as “benign” profit-sharing
with the state (South Korea, China,
most advanced countries)
Effective Implementation
Benefit of Rent minus
Rent-Seeking Cost is Positive
Institutions and Politics regulating Rent-Seeking/Corruption
Institutional/Political Imperatives Driving
Potentially Beneficial Interventions/Rents
 
Figure 3 Drivers of State-Constraining Corruption 
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Figure 3 shows that state-constraining corruption can be associated with both good or 
bad economic outcomes (even though the corruption is always a constraint or cost 
when we compare the situation to a hypothetical one where corruption did not exist 
but the same intervention could by implemented). When the outcomes of potentially 
beneficial interventions are poor, the appropriate strategy would be to look at the 
political and institutional problems preventing the implementation of beneficial 
interventions, and the ways in which corruption and rent seeking may be subverting 
this process. The aim should be to attack corruption in ways that improve 
implementation, and in the long run, convert the corruption into legal forms of rent 
seeking. Focusing on reducing corruption alone is inadequate in the case of state-
constraining corruption, as this may inadvertently damage state capacities to intervene 
effectively even further. It is always possible to remove corruption by removing the 
intervention in question. But in this case, it would not necessarily be desirable to do 
that, or even to significantly reduce the autonomous capacity of the state to engage in 
the necessary interventions.  
 
Anti-corruption strategy for state-constraining corruption should therefore focus on 
strengthening state capacities (both institutional and political) to promote growth and 
welfare and to convert illegal rent seeking into legal forms. In doing so, policy should 
recognize that when corruption or rent seeking subverts the implementation of 
beneficial state activities, it is not because of the corruption or rent seeking per se, as 
the latter is always present whenever states intervene. But where states are 
institutionally and politically strong, rent seeking and corruption changes the 
distribution of some of the benefits of state rent creation while rents continue to be 
managed in socially beneficial ways. Consider the industrial policy in South Korea in 
the 1960s and 1970s, or the role of the Chinese state in making land and infrastructure 
available for investors. In both cases, considerable rent seeking and corruption was 
associated with these state activities. But in institutionally and politically strong states 
like these, the state is able to allocate benefits to maximize economic returns and 
extract a share of these gains for itself. In contrast, in institutionally and politically 
weak states, state leaders are unable to allocate rents in ways that maximize economic 
returns, and the bribes or kickbacks they extract are paradoxically lower than their 
counterparts in strong states. This is why we should focus on strengthening state 
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capacities in these cases, with a secondary emphasis on reducing and regulating 
corruption.  
 
In African countries, transformative state capacities for promoting growth are 
particularly weak. In these countries, early attempts at industrialization using the 
public sector and variants of import substituting industrialization proved relatively 
unsuccessful. In many cases, an industrial base was created from a very low starting 
point. But there were significant differences in terms of the level of industrialization. 
Tanzania was one of the less successful African countries with some of the lowest 
levels of industrialization in the region. But by the 1980s, infant industry policies 
began to be abandoned across Africa as in other poorly performing developing 
countries in Asia. Strategies of liberalization and privatization in these countries could 
be easily justified given the large losses incurred by the public sector as a direct result 
of these policies. Consequently, the range of state capacities began to shrink 
significantly in the subsequent period.  
 
While state weakness in the post-independence emerging African states had 
undoubtedly resulted in very poor results, this was very largely due to the weakness of 
the states and their failure to manage rents and discipline the rent allocation process. 
Some of the policies were also misguided and lessons were not learnt in time about 
the futility of some of the strategies of industrialization that were being attempted. But 
the failure to learn from mistakes is itself a very good indicator of state weakness and 
of the capture of critical rents by powerful groups who cannot be dislodged because of 
the political and institutional weakness of the state. We have argued that at early 
stages of development there are critical transformative functions of the state to 
promote technology acquisition and upgrading. The challenge for African countries as 
indeed for all poorly performing countries is to identify critical transformative 
capacities and build up these capacities. Anti-corruption strategies in these areas 
should be aimed at limiting the subversion of critical state capacities and enabling 
legal and well-regulated rent seeking around these necessary and critical state 
functions whenever possible. 
 
From the policy perspective, it is important to be able to distinguish between market-
restricting corruption where it is appropriate to focus policy on directly attacking the 
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damaging interventions and state-constraining corruption where the appropriate policy 
response is almost entirely the opposite, to strengthen and enhance state capacities. 
The applied problem is often that if the implementation of potentially beneficial 
interventions goes wrong, the potential net benefit is not realized. Thus, observed ex 
post potentially beneficial interventions are often difficult to distinguish from 
damaging interventions. To decide on the appropriate reform strategy, governance 
reformers need to ask whether the underlying state activity or intervention could 
potentially benefit society, even though it may not be doing so now, perhaps because 
the intervention was being subverted by corruption. Judging the potential benefit of an 
intervention is to some extent a matter of judgement, but it is nevertheless a 
judgement that has to be made. If our informed conclusion is yes, and if the 
intervention is legal, the corruption associated with such interventions is state-
constraining corruption.  
 
Box 3 Rents/Interventions Associated with State-Constraining Corruption 
 
Examples of rents/state activities associated with State-Constraining 
Corruption: 
Subsidies that potentially serve useful welfare functions (poverty reduction) 
Subsidies or regulations that aim to accelerate technology acquisition and 
learning  
 
Associated Corruption: 
Bribes to capture subsidies  
Kickbacks to public official from beneficiaries of subsidies  
 
Policy Responses: 
Strengthen political and institutional capacity to prevent subversion of policy 
(even though rent seeking/corruption cannot be rooted out entirely)  
Legalize rent seeking whenever possible to make it easier to regulate  
 
 
 3) Political Corruption and Primitive Accumulation.  
 a) Political Corruption: The pervasiveness of corruption in all developing 
countries cannot be explained by either of the two types of corruption discussed so 
far. Every developing country has high levels of corruption, irrespective of the size of 
the public sector, government policies, culture, religion, ethnic fragmentation and 
political institutions. All of these variables have at best a small effect in explaining 
differences in corruption across developing countries in cross section studies. To 
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explain the pervasiveness of corruption in all developing countries we need to look at 
the political and economic features that are common to all these countries. One of 
these common features is political stabilization using off-budget transfers. This is 
discussed in this sub-section. The other is property right instability and the 
pervasiveness of non-market transfers in which states play a critical role, discussed in 
the next sub-section. In both cases, the state activities are themselves illegal and 
cannot be made legal but are potentially necessary for the operation of the emerging 
capitalist economy. In both cases, the interventions are by definition directly corrupt 
and are likely to be associated with secondary corruption in ways discussed later. 
 
Political corruption is a structural problem in developing countries given the limited 
availability of fiscal resources. In advanced countries, political stability depends not 
just on the high levels of average incomes but also on significant transfers of income 
organized through the fiscal system. These transfers provide rents to critical 
constituencies through the fiscal mechanism. The share of GDP that is taxed in 
advanced countries ranges from 35 to 50 per cent. As much as half or more of the 
total is disbursed as a pure income transfer and a significant part of the rest is an 
effective transfer of public goods to constituencies that could not have paid to 
purchase these services. In contrast, developing countries are lucky to be able to tax 
10-20 per cent of much smaller national incomes. After paying the salaries of civil 
servants, many of the poorer developing countries find they are already running 
budget deficits, and even in the relatively better off ones, there is little left for 
redistribution after infrastructure and essential public good have been provided. So 
how is political stability maintained in these contexts?  
 
The answer is that political stability in developing countries depends on off-budget 
transfers to critical constituencies using patron-client networks operated by the parties 
and groups in power. Powerful constituencies in developing countries do indeed 
demand transfers for themselves, but the absence of fiscal resources means they are 
organized in patron-client networks to get access to resources that states dispense but 
cannot by definition account for in a transparent way.  
 
These off-budget resources are by definition political corruption. In addition, political 
corruption also induces secondary corruption as state leaders or their parties have to 
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engage in corrupt activities to raise off-budget resources for sustaining themselves in 
power. Without these resources developing country political regimes would not 
remain viable for very long, given that fiscal resources cannot be rapidly increased in 
the immediate future. Thus, we find that developing country regimes need to raise 
grey resources through corruption for distribution down patron-client networks or 
they need to allow critical clients to engage in corruption to directly raise the 
resources they require for giving their political allegiance to the group in power. This 
also explains why political entrepreneurs in developing countries are often individuals 
well known for their corruption or are known criminals. But they keep getting re-
elected even in countries with strong democratic traditions like India, because clients 
of these politicians know they can ‘deliver’.  
 
This type of political corruption can only be countered by public pressure when fiscal 
resources are available for political parties to make electoral commitments to key 
constituencies that they can legally deliver through the budget. It is also worth noting 
that the fiscal resources required for political stabilization would also have to be 
significantly greater than the resources that are available through patron-client 
networks. This is because transparent fiscal transfers would have to be allocated to 
everyone satisfying particular criteria of poverty or need and could not just be 
targeted to the constituencies posing the greatest potential political danger for the 
ruling regimes.  
 
Figure 4 shows that the drivers of this type of corruption have little to do with the type 
of economic policies or political institutions that the developing country has. Nor is it 
dependent on the political will of the leadership to fight corruption or the degree of 
transparency. The example of India shows how transparently corrupt and even 
criminal politicians can be routinely elected because they have the resources to deliver 
to their clients and to spend in elections. Clearly, this type of corruption cannot be 
affected by any of the reforms appropriate for market-restricting corruption. 
 
Political corruption cannot be seriously dented till countries have achieved middle-
income status or better and significant fiscal resources are available for political 
stabilization through transparent budgetary transfers. However, even in poor countries 
political corruption raises issues that are relevant for governance advisors and 
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reformers. As Figure 4 shows, the institutional and political capacities of states can 
help to determine whether the off-budget allocation of resources for political 
stabilization actually succeeds in achieving sufficient political stability for economic 
development. If it does not, political corruption is no different from predation 
(examined in section 4). While political corruption cannot be entirely removed in 
most developing countries given the nature of the drivers, governance reform can 
focus on strengthening the institutional and political conditions that enhance the 
capacity of the state to maintain political stability with the resources available.  
 
Political Instability and
Subverted Economic Interventions:
Accumulation Falters or Collapses
Political Stability and
Insulated Economic Interventions:
Capitalist Accumulation Continues
Institutional Capacity to Manage Political
Stabilization using Off-Budget Resources
Politically Driven Corruption to Raise
Off-Budget Resources
Developing Economy with
Limited Fiscal Resources
Political Factions seeking
Redistributive Rents
 
Figure 4 Drivers of Political Corruption 
 
If the state and the polity are highly fragmented, the distribution of rents through the 
state will fail to achieve stability and the extraction of resources from society for 
redistribution to powerful factions can appear to be increasingly predatory. In extreme 
cases, the outcome shown in the right hand fork in Figure 4 is no different from the 
predatory outcome discussed in our next section. We will see that predatory behaviour 
by the state is the worst form of corruption. However, not all types of political 
corruption should be confused with predation because while predation is avoidable 
and damaging, most forms of political corruption are not avoidable and programmes 
that seek to eliminate this problem in the short to medium term are doomed to fail in 
poor country contexts.  
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  3b) Primitive Accumulation. Primitive accumulation refers to the non-market 
transfers of assets that are typical in emerging capitalist economies before a broad-
based capitalist market economy has emerged. The absence of some state capacities 
and the presence of others play a vital role in these transfers, and we argue that these 
state roles are unavoidable in emerging economies where the capitalist sector is very 
small to begin with. At these early stages of development, these critical non-market 
transfers cannot be legalized for reasons that we discuss below, so once again, we 
have a set of essential state functions that cannot be legalized. By definition, many of 
these state activities or state-supported activities are corrupt, and they trigger secondly 
corruption as rent seekers try to influence the state to benefit from these non-market 
transfers of assets.  
 
The background to these non-market transfers is that in a developing economy the 
bulk of economic activity is still carried out in pre-capitalist (traditional) economic 
sectors that face growing economic collapse. This collapse is due to the fact that the 
existing owners of assets, who are organizing production using pre-capitalist methods, 
and using backward technologies, are increasingly unviable in terms of the incomes 
they can generate for themselves and for their workers. This means that they are 
unable to pay for the protection of their assets either through a public system of 
taxation or through the private purchase of protection. This, rather than the 
inefficiency of the state, explains why property rights are universally weak and 
unstable in developing countries. The common policy response to this property right 
instability is to attempt to strengthen the legal system and thereby stabilize property 
rights. This ignores the fundamental structural factors driving property right 
instability in developing countries. If the driver of property right instability is the 
absence of a wide range of viable firms that can generate the economic surplus to pay 
for property right stabilization, then trying to achieve stabilization as a precondition 
for a viable economy is putting the cart before the horse. How will society pay for this 
stabilization when its productive sector does not produce a significant economic 
surplus? The assumption that property right instability is due only to the mendacity of 
state leaders is wrong. Advanced countries have stable property rights and low market 
transaction costs because productive enterprises in these countries can pay significant 
amounts for the protection of property rights through their states.  
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 One of the effects of low productivity assets is that in developing countries, much if 
not most asset transfers take place through non-market mechanisms. Non-market 
transfers refer to “politically negotiated” transfers where the transfer is not based on a 
voluntary contract negotiated by individuals. In the context of the type of system 
change that developing countries are going through, we refer to non-market transfers 
as “primitive accumulation”. The non-market transfers at issue include taxes and 
subsidies that favour particular groups, allocations of resources by the state through 
compulsory purchase orders or outright appropriations, zoning and planning 
permissions that create privileged access for some in the allocation of land, state price 
fixing that privileges the acquisition of assets by some individuals over others, to give 
a few examples. At the other extreme, non-market transfers can include outright theft 
of resources by individuals with military or political power.  
 
But all non-market transfers involve the state (or its absence) in the exercise of 
political power to capture resources. In dynamic countries, the transfers benefit 
emerging entrepreneurs who are subsequently able to protect their investments as 
their productivity increases, and generate greater surpluses, while in lagging countries 
resources are captured by political entrepreneurs who are unable or unwilling to make 
productive investments. In the latter case, non-market transfers appear to be 
increasingly predatory, as discussed in the next section. Figure 5 shows the drivers of 
primitive accumulation are structural features of developing countries that cannot be 
easily addressed by standard anti-corruption measures. The important point is that in 
extreme cases, the damaging outcomes shown along the right hand fork in Figure 5 
are no different from predatory outcomes discussed in the next section.  
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Unproductive Groups:
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Non-Market Asset Transfers (Primitive Accumulation)
“Regulated” by State Institutions
Factions and Public Officials
exploiting opportunities
Low-Productivity Economy
(unable to pay for enforcement)
 
Figure 5 Drivers of Primitive Accumulation 
 
While predatory outcomes can result from the same factors that drive primitive 
accumulation, it is important to remember that primitive accumulation was a feature 
of all developing countries (including, for instance, the case of the enclosures in 
England that transferred common land to emerging capitalist landlords). If we look 
only at the failed cases, we could easily conclude that the problem is the prevalence of 
non-market transfers, and that therefore the solution is to stop these transfers by 
strengthening property rights, enforcing individual contracts and bolstering the court 
and legal system (Clague, et al. 1997; Kauffman, et al. 1999). This is indeed the 
strategy forward by many donors attempting to reduce ‘expropriation risk’ by 
strengthening court systems and spending resources on the rule of law. These attempts 
are not necessarily misguided as long as we do not expect to see dramatic results.  
 
The historical evidence does not support the claim that expropriation risk can actually 
be significantly lowered in countries with low productivity assets. While long term 
historical data is unavailable for expropriation risk, some authors such as Acemoglu et 
al. (2001) try to find support in very long run data using instrumental variables. 
Despite the huge impact of their work, their data and the methods are questionable 
because it is difficult to prove that the countries and periods in the past that they 
describe as having low expropriation risk really did have low expropriation risk across 
the board. Colonies where European colonists went and settled in large numbers did 
better than countries where they did not, and Acemoglu et al. interpret this as showing 
that in the first group of countries Europeans introduced a good rule of law and low 
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expropriation risk, from which the country eventually benefited. However, the 
historical evidence does not necessarily support this argument. The countries where 
Europeans went to suffered huge expropriation risk for many indigenous peoples who 
lost access to land and resources rapidly. The only difference was that since 
Europeans came from countries that were already capitalist, the gainers from this 
early primitive accumulation in European settled colonies were emerging capitalists 
while in other colonies the transition to capitalism was delayed by imperial trade and 
industrial policies that reserved these countries as markets for European manufactured 
products. Without attempting to resolve these historical debates in this paper, all we 
need to note is that the thesis that successful development happened in countries with 
stable property rights is not proven. Capitalists enjoyed low expropriation risk in 
successful countries, but in general, there was a lot of expropriation going on from 
non-capitalist sectors.  
 
Rents/Interventions Associated with Political Corruption and Primitive 
Accumulation 
 
Examples of rents/interventions associated with political corruption and 
primitive accumulation: 
Transfers of resources through patron-client networks to sustain power and 
maintain stability. 
Transfers of low productivity assets/land through non-market mechanisms  
 
Associated corruption: 
Many of these activities are directly corrupt as public officials break the law for 
their personal survival or benefit. 
Secondary corruption can emerge as political leaders raise funds for political 
expenditures.  
Secondary corruption can emerge as expropriators bribe public officials to assist 
non-market asset transfers. 
 
Policy Responses: 
Significant reductions of these types of corruption are unlikely before asset 
productivity and fiscal space has improved. 
Interim policy has to concentrate on preventing the collapse of these types of 
corruption into predation (see next section) by strengthening institutional 
coordination across state agencies, and countering political fragmentation by 
promoting political capacities to maintain political order. 
 
The recent experience of countries like South Korea, Thailand, or China suggests that 
low expropriation risk in high growth developing countries is at best a privilege of 
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productive investors, and certainly not a privilege enjoyed by pre-capitalist and 
traditional sectors that are losing assets to the emerging sectors through the very 
processes of primitive accumulation (Khan 2004a). The difference between high and 
low growth developers is not that property rights are stable across the board in the 
former, but rather that property rights are stable for productive investors in the former, 
whereas in the latter, property rights are stable for unproductive expropriators or for 
no group at all.  
 
The policy question should therefore be why productive entrepreneurs do not emerge 
in Africa from the property right instability that is characteristic of the collapse of pre-
capitalist economic systems. Since political power is implicated in all transfers, why 
do politically powerful groups not use their power to transform themselves or their 
clients into capitalist entrepreneurs and thereby generate much higher payoffs for 
themselves than the wealth they can expropriate through looting? The factors that 
could explain why non-market transfers degenerate into predation in many African 
countries will be discussed in the next section.  
 
4) Predation. The worst type of corruption from a development perspective is shown 
in box 4 in Figure 1. This corruption is associated with state activities that are illegal 
and that do not play any potentially beneficial role in society. Extortion and theft by 
public officials are examples of such state activities. The drivers of this type of 
corruption are similar to both political corruption and primitive accumulation, except 
that while the latter may potentially play a functional role during the developmental 
transition, predation and extortion do not. A number of factors could help to ensure 
that processes similar to political corruption or primitive accumulation have very 
damaging effects. We will discuss a number of these factors that may be relevant in 
the African context but the one that appears to have the greatest significance in 
comparison to the Asian context is the institutional and political fragmentation of the 
state. If the institutional and political capacity of the state to enforce its will is weak, 
processes like political corruption and primitive accumulation are likely to display 
predatory characteristics.  
 
Political corruption or primitive accumulation are certainly not desirable, but in the 
absence of alternative processes that can feasibly achieve political stabilization or the 
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restructuring of assets through efficient markets, given the fiscal constraints discussed 
earlier, they may play a potentially necessary role during the developmental transition. 
But for that to happen, we require that the state has the minimal institutional and 
political capacity to maintain political stability (using political corruption as one of its 
tools) and we require that those who gain assets through non-market transfers are 
secure enough in their possession of these assets to begin to engage in productive 
activities. Otherwise, political corruption and primitive accumulation will both have 
all the characteristics of extortion and predation. 
 
Thus, the only distinctive feature of predation compared to the processes discussed 
earlier in section 3 is that in the case of predation, the state is politically and 
institutionally weak. As a result, claim for transfers from competing factions are likely 
to escalate and even significant transfers to factions may fail to achieve political 
stability. At the same time, the fragmentation of the state means that those who gain 
assets through non-market processes are themselves likely to be under attack from 
other factions or parts of the state. In such circumstances, it is very likely that 
appropriators will use their appropriations in unproductive ways, for instance in 
conspicuous consumption or hoarded outside the country. Thus, predatory corruption 
is most likely to emerge with a weak and/or fragmented state that is unable to control 
the factional competition for rents, and is unable to ensure that even the emerging 
powerful groups in society have any security over their new possessions.  
 
The drivers of predatory corruption are shown in Figure 6. They are very similar to 
the drivers of political corruption (Figure 4) and primitive accumulation (Figure 5) 
except that predatory corruption has an additional driver: a weak and/or fragmented 
state. African countries differ significantly from the more successful Asian countries 
in that the fragmentation of their polities and states is more serious and this can 
explain why corruption in Africa frequently has predatory characteristics. The policy 
conclusion here for anti-corruption strategies is that where the fragmentation of the 
state is a major causal factor behind predation, it needs to be addressed directly with 
institutional and political reforms. A general anti-corruption strategy will not do, 
particularly since many of the reforms associated with fighting market-restricting 
corruption (such as liberalization and privatization) may further fragment very fragile 
states.  
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Figure 6 Drivers of Predatory Corruption 
 
The importance of the effective capacity of the state to enforce rights and rents in 
preventing predatory strategies is most clearly demonstrated in an Asian context by 
the very different roles played by Chiang Kai Shek and the Kuomintang in mainland 
China and Taiwan. The historical record tells us that Chiang Kai Shek mysteriously 
transformed himself apparently overnight from a notorious predatory warlord in 
China in the decade up to 1948 to one of the most remarkable developmental leaders 
of the twentieth century when he arrived in Taiwan in 1949. This transition coincided 
with the defeat of his party, the Kuomintang, in mainland China and their migration to 
Taiwan. We can make sense of this incredible transformation simply in terms of the 
effective power of implementation of the leadership, and the implications this had for 
leadership strategies.  
 
In mainland China, Chiang was only one of many warlords, none of whom could 
effectively enforce their will on the others. In such a context, looting is a rational 
response of each since any gains that are invested are subject to the predation of 
others. But in Taiwan, Chiang suddenly achieved an effective capacity to discipline 
factions and to protect the rights of those who could deliver growth. While in China, 
the Kuomintang was not large enough or organized enough to impose order, it was 
more than sufficient in tiny Taiwan. It no longer made sense to engage in looting 
because much greater rewards were available to the dominant party by engaging in 
development (Khan 1995). This example powerfully demonstrates the importance of 
the power of enforcement, rather than the intrinsic preferences of the leadership in 
determining leadership strategies. It also underlines the importance of effective parties 
or other political organizations in developing countries as a precondition for the 
establishment of developmental institutions.  
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Our emphasis on the institutional and political fragmentation of states can be 
contrasted with a number of other alternative explanations of why African states are 
weak and prone to predatory characteristics. The most important explanations and the 
main problems that they face are as follows.  
 
Alternative Explanations of Predatory Politics in Africa.  
a) Neo-patrimonialism. The argument here is that African states are distinctively 
pre-modern. This analysis goes back to Médard who has written a number of pieces, 
with the main arguments summarized in Médard (2002). The neo-patrimonial state 
contrasts with a modern Weberian state that is supposed to be impersonal, formal, 
accountable and non-corrupt. The neo-patrimonial state is the precise opposite, with 
personalized and informal relationships between the boss or patron and his clients. 
The patron is accountable and hugely corrupt, treating the public domain as a private 
fief, and dispensing benefits to clients to stay in power. While all these characteristics 
are clearly visible in Africa, we have argued that these features are common to all 
developing countries going through the developmental transformation.  
 
Médard argues that the problem in Africa is the absence of accountability that allows 
leaders to treat the public domain as their private fief. The policy suggested is the 
support of democratization and accountability as a way of making the state eventually 
become more modern and Weberian. This strategy is based on a theoretical argument 
and not backed up by any historical observation that democratization has driven 
(rather than having followed) the emergence of a modern Weberian state anywhere in 
the world (Khan 2005a).  
 
b) African Culture. A variant of the neo-patrimonial argument is that the 
personalized politics observed in Africa is due to particular characteristics of African 
peasant culture. The ‘economy of affection’ emerges in the fragmented economy of 
African agriculture where exchange has to be based on personalized relationships and 
patrimonial politics results from this economy (Hyden and Williams 1994). But again, 
a comparison with the Asian experience suggests there is nothing unique about the 
African peasant economy. James Scott had made exactly the same observations about 
the Asian peasantry in his account of the moral economy of the Vietnamese peasantry 
(Scott 1977). These accounts are consistent with our explanation of why property 
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rights are not protected through formal institutions in poor economies and why 
exchanges that do not conform to modern market transactions dominate in these 
economies. However, this did not preclude transitions to productive capitalist 
economies in Asia. It is not clear why peasant culture alone should be playing this 
negative role in Africa. 
 
c) Ethnic fragmentation. A third common response about Africa refers to the ethnic 
fragmentation in Africa, and the fact that many African states have not resolved 
fundamental questions about their territorial limits and ethnic compositions. The 
argument here is that this prevents any dominant group in an African polity being able 
to enforce rights or even decisions about the allocation of social resources. There is an 
element of truth in this argument but ethnic fragmentation should not be overstated as 
an explanation of state weakness. The extent of fragmentation varies across African 
countries. Often conflicts over resources can take an ethnic form, but these conflicts 
would probably have been just as intense in ethnically homogenous societies where 
cleavages would have been organized along other lines. It is also worth remembering 
that many African countries are relatively new, having just emerged from colonial 
occupation as in Mozambique and Angola. The Asian experience of post-
independence development shows periods of considerable turmoil can follow 
independence even in ethnically homogenous societies (think of Bangladesh in the 
1970s).  
 
It is equally important to remember that national identities even in states that now 
appear to be ethnically homogenous were always products of social engineering. 
Successful states in Asia and Europe have created national identities with differing 
degrees of success. Asian states like Thailand that appear to be ethnically 
homogenous today, achieved this through very specific state policies of nation-
building that were often not very pleasant for minorities (such as the Chinese in the 
case of Thailand). Examples of states working to create homogenous or at least 
cohesive national identities are not absent in Africa: the case of Tanzania is 
particularly interesting because the creation of a composite national identity was one 
of the primary goals of the Nyerere years, and by all accounts, the results were quite 
remarkable in the African context. The Tanzanian experience shows that nation 
building is a long process where outsiders can contribute little but could potentially do 
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much damage by suggesting easy options that may not exist. While it is clear that a 
minimal national consensus is required for a society to embark on any development 
strategy, the challenge is to identify what needs to be done in terms of institutional 
reform priorities once a minimal national consensus emerges in countries like 
Tanzania.  
 
d) Africa’s Resource Curse. It is often also argued that Africa’s problems with weak 
states and the descent into predation stems from the easy availability of natural 
resource rents, while Asia was helped by the absence of these natural resource rents. 
The argument is that warring factions in Africa can sustain conflict by financing 
themselves using natural resources. Conversely, the leadership of resource-poor Asian 
countries had to concentrate on how to produce wealth through industrialization. But 
while the easy availability of resources can sustain conflict, it does not explain why 
fragmentation exists in the first place since the discovery of windfall incomes in a 
country with a strong state could be a spur to development. Industrialization requires 
resources for investment, and where states with some enforcement capacity exist, 
natural resources can be very helpful in generating resources for high rates of 
investment in industry. This strategy was very successfully followed, for instance, by 
Malaysia.  
 
In themselves, natural resource rents are not damaging (see for instance Khan 2000a). 
Indeed, these are necessary rents from an economic perspective, as they help to 
achieve a rate of extraction of natural resources that is closer to the sustainable or 
optimal level. As with all rents, the existence of natural resource rents will induce rent 
seeking and possibly corruption, but the overall effects would be beneficial as long as 
the corruption did not subvert state policies completely. In other words, natural 
resource rents are necessary rents that states should protect by creating and protecting 
the rights over natural resources on which these rents depend. The corruption directly 
associated with this state activity would then be a variant of the state-constraining 
corruption discussed earlier. The argument suggested here somewhat different. It 
claims that the presence of natural resource rents can unleash rent seeking on a scale 
that destroys the unity of the state, allowing the emergence of predation. While this is 
theoretically possible, there is no reason to believe that it is inevitable. Even in Africa, 
there are already plenty of counter-examples. Botswana’s success has been based on 
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natural resource rents but it has not succumbed to civil war. Ghana exports large 
amounts of gold but is relatively peaceful, and even Angola is moving into a more 
peaceful era as well as being Africa’s largest diamond exporter. 
 
We can accept the argument that natural resources can sustain conflicts that would 
otherwise have to be fought using more primitive weapons, but this does not mean 
that in the absence of these rents the fragmented states would have become cohesive. 
Fragmented states without natural resources can always discover new ways of 
generating income to sustain conflict, ranging from drugs to intervening in conflicts in 
neighbouring countries. It is quite plausible for instance to argue that Saudi Arabia 
without the oil may have been more like Afghanistan than South Korea. Thus, without 
denying the complications (both positive and negative) created by the presence of 
natural resource rents, we need to ask why states remain institutionally fragmented 
and politically weak in some contexts but manage to reform themselves and become 
developmental in others. The Asian experience suggests that developmental states 
emerged in both resource poor countries (South Korea, Taiwan) as well as in resource 
rich countries (Malaysia). Equally, weak states have persisted in many Asian 
countries that are resource poor (Nepal, Bangladesh). These observations are 
particularly relevant for Africa where large natural resource endowments should be 
seen as an opportunity rather than a curse. Institutional and governance capacities 
should be developed that allows resource rich African countries to manage these rents 
for economic development. This includes national capabilities for exercising greater 
control and regulation over multinationals coming to exploit natural resources, not 
less as is often assumed is necessary for efficiency (Amsden and Hikino 2005). 
 
e) Institutional Fragmentation of the State. While we do not deny that some of the 
previous explanations can play a limited role in some countries, we find the next two 
approaches more fruitful because they stand up to a comparative Asia-Africa analysis. 
As a general observation, the institutional fragmentation of the state can result in 
predatory behaviour because different parts of the state can behave in uncoordinated 
ways. Given the structural factors driving political corruption and primitive 
accumulation in developing countries, a centralized state would soon recognize that 
its interests were best served by moderating political corruption to a level that 
maintained political stability while at the same time allowing asset transfers to 
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productive capitalists. In other words, if the political leadership of a developing 
country had the capacity to enforce the rights it chose to enforce, even a moderately 
intelligent leadership would soon realize that even its selfish interests would be best 
served by economic development. This is the argument put forward by Olson when he 
contrasted stationary bandits (a cohesive and stable state) with roving bandits (a 
fragmented and unstable state) (Olson 2000). A very similar point is made by Shleifer 
and Vishny in their analysis of the effects of corruption in fragmented and centralized 
states. They argue that corruption has worse effects if the state is institutionally 
fragmented (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Khan 1996a).  
 
Not all Asian states were institutionally cohesive in the post-colonial period. But 
colonial powers had often been in Asia longer and had fashioned more developed 
colonial states from the already more established pre-colonial states that existed in 
most Asian countries. Weak institutional capacity and the fragmentation of states are 
clearly very important in explaining the somewhat more frequent observations of 
predatory behaviour in Africa. But in the very successful Asian countries, it was not 
just that states were more institutionally developed when the colonial powers left, but 
in addition, institutional development took them rapidly towards even more capable 
states. Our problem is to understand better why if weak and fragmented state 
institutions are so damaging, they also appear to be so persistent in some countries but 
not in others.  
 
If the problem were purely an institutional one, developing countries and their leaders 
would themselves have strong incentives to put this right, without much advice from 
economists or donors. Clearly institutional fragmentation is rarely a purely 
institutional problem that can be resolved by changing the structure of ministries or 
departments. Underlying the institutional fragmentation of the state is usually a 
political problem whereby different parts of the state may have been captured by 
different factions or interests and establishing a cohesive state may require the 
resolution of the underlying conflicts between factions. This takes us to the last, most 
important factor underlying state weakness, and driving corruption towards predatory 
forms.  
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f) The Political Fragmentation of Polities. The persistence of institutional 
fragmentation and weak state capabilities may have a lot to do with the political 
fragmentation of the polity, particularly taking the form of multiple well-organized 
factions that each seek to gain maximum power and rents for itself. Just as with the 
fragmentation of state institutions, political fragmentation can result in different 
factions attempting to appropriate rents for themselves. But as no faction can be sure 
that their gains are secure, winning factions do not begin to invest in production and 
the slow transition to productive capitalism does not begin. The metaphor of roving 
and stationary bandits can be used here too, but the problem here is to with political 
fragmentation rather than the institutional structure. While institutional fragmentation 
can be addressed by institutional reforms, political fragmentation can only be 
addressed by political reorganizations, for instance through the construction of new 
parties and political movements. Donors are obviously less keen about these 
instruments, but we should at least understand their importance and the limitations of 
what can be done in the absence of political measures to address political problems.  
 
The political fragmentation of polities in Africa has been frequently commented on. 
For instance, Chabal and Daloz (1999) in an influential argument observed that in 
African states disorder was institutionalized. What they refer to is precisely the 
disorder that allows the transfer of resources down patron-client networks. The 
weakness of their argument is that what they refer to as a specifically African problem 
is actually at a general level a characteristic of all developing countries. In terms of 
our discussion of political corruption and primitive accumulation, the 
institutionalization of disorder is a characteristic of all developing country societies. 
Or to put it differently, the institutionalization of order (stable property rights, 
entrenched democracy, low or negligible corruption, the accountability of leaders and 
so on) requires a significant level of development in order to be effectively 
implemented.  
 
So what is distinctive about Africa? Chabal and Daloz, and most commentators on 
Africa appear to be saying that African leaderships do not have the political will to 
make the difficult transition of imposing order and then trying to capture productive 
surpluses by enhancing production instead of the easy surpluses that can be captured 
through unproductive means. We are suggesting that the focus of attention should be 
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on the institutional and political fragmentation of African states, and not on the 
political will, integrity or other characteristics of the leadership, important though 
these may also be in some contexts. The importance of political fragmentation in Asia 
in explaining the differential performance of Asian countries has been explored in 
Khan’s work (Khan 1996b, 1999, 2000b). Some of these ideas have been developed 
in the African context in the recent work of Lockwood (2005). The Asian experience 
suggests that the same political leaderships (and therefore the same political will) 
achieved very different things when political organizations and their ability to enforce 
changed. Of course, building the mass organizations and enforcement institutions that 
may eventually allow African societies to make more rapid transitions to productive 
economies is also a matter of conscious political activity, but this is the activity of 
many people doing many things, and is not the same as the attribution of absent 
political will to a specific leadership. 
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Part B: Case Study of Tanzania 
 
B.1. Introduction 
 
Tanzania has emerged from twenty years of economic and political reform as one of 
Africa’s fastest growing economies, with GDP growth taking off in 1997-98 and 
rising to 6.3 percent in 2004 (URT, 2005). Tanzania has also maintained its status as 
one of the continent’s most peaceful and politically stable countries. Underlying this 
success story however is the fact that the average growth rate of GDP per capita from 
1990 – 2003 was only 1.1%. There is also concern that weak institutions of 
governance are hampering the ability of the Tanzanian state to sustain growth and 
bring about widespread poverty reduction. In particular, concern has focused on 
pervasive corruption, lack of transparency and accountability of government, weak 
democratic systems, inefficient market distortions and endemic rent seeking (URT 
1996, 2003, 2004; World Bank 2000).   
 
The purpose of this case study is to explore how the framework developed in Part A 
can enhance the understanding of governance and growth in Tanzania. The case study 
traces the historical evolution of political and economic power in Tanzania in order to 
identify the broad institutional and political factors that have influenced patterns of 
rents and rent seeking. We then review five key policy areas of the governance 
agenda, placing these issues within the framework outlined in Part A and suggesting 
ways in which DFID can use this analysis in designing its governance programme for 
Tanzania. 
 
Our analysis uses secondary data, published and grey literature on Tanzania’s political 
and economic history as well as previous studies on rent seeking. We also undertook 
interviews with Tanzanian representatives from the public and private sector and 
DFID staff in Dar es Salaam and in London in 2005. 
 
B.2. Background: Economic and Political Overview 
Tanzania ranks amongst the world’s poorest countries with a GDP per capita of 330 
USD (World Bank 2004). It has gone through very little structural change since its 
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independence in 1961, remaining predominantly an agrarian society with around 80% 
of its population of 36 million still employed in low productivity agriculture. It was 
during colonial rule from 1880 to 1961 that the structure of the Tanzanian economy 
and the roots of its internal political power structure were established. After the First 
World War and the end of German colonial rule in 1917, Tanzania1 was made a 
British protectorate under a League of Nations Mandate, which effectively put it “at 
the bottom of the imperial pecking order” (Iliffe; 1979:302). Tanzania’s protectorate 
status implied a time-constrained period of colonial rule and this meant that a 
significant transformation of the country’s economic systems was even less a priority 
for the colonial state compared to other colonies. Instead, the primary objective of the 
colonial state was the maintenance of political stability over the medium term.   
 
In terms of the economic structure of Tanzania, the most important changes that 
occurred during the colonial period were in the agriculture sector. Unlike many Asian 
countries which had established peasant systems of agriculture for hundreds of years 
prior to colonialism, peasant agriculture came to prominence during the colonial 
period with the consolidation of settled small-holder agriculture across the country. 
The system of peasant production, once established, received little challenge from 
large-scale settler agriculture. Settler farms received limited state support and 
expropriation of land was relatively low, compared to neighbouring Kenya where the 
development of large-scale settler agriculture had important implications for the 
emergence of a landless working class and for rural development, in contrast to 
Tanzania. 
 
It was only after the Second World War that the colonial authorities, in response to 
European post-war shortages and the growing demands of richer peasants for a more 
rapid pace of agricultural transformation, began to promote commercial farming by 
Africans. Prior to this, the native administrations actively discouraged emerging 
African capitalist agriculture by limiting the availability of credit and banning 
commercial land transactions. At independence the peasant system of agriculture was 
                                                 
1 Prior to the union with Zanzibar in 1977, Tanzania’s official name was Tanganyika. This report shall 
use the name Tanzania throughout. 
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firmly entrenched and while capitalist African agriculture had taken root, this group, 
consisting only of a few hundred farmers (Iliffe; 1974) had very little political clout.  
 
The enduring strength of smallholder agriculture has important implications for 
understanding the strategies of the Tanzanian state following independence. In terms 
of the capacity to invest and generate productivity growth, we see peasant agriculture 
as a constraint for long-term development, in contrast to many writers on African 
agriculture. In this our position on the prospects of Tanzanian peasant agriculture (and 
African peasant agriculture more generally) is similar to that of Sachs et al. (2004). 
Our analysis of peasant agriculture is also different from authors such as Hyden 
(1981) who present Tanzanian peasant agriculture as a pristine and self-sufficient 
form of production more in line with indigenous culture. In Hyden’s argument 
(referred to in Part A), the personalized relationships characterizing peasant 
agriculture explain the dominance of patrimonial relationships within the state. As we 
argued in Part A, patrimonial politics and patron-client networks exist in all 
developing countries regardless of the organization of agriculture and their social 
cultures, and so patrimonial politics in Tanzania is likely to have wider causes than 
the prevalence of peasant agriculture. As in all developing countries, peasant 
agriculture in Tanzania faces the economic constraints of low investment and 
productivity, and as elsewhere, there is a slow transformation of rural production and 
ownership patterns. The colonial history and the dominance of peasant agriculture at 
independence do explain however why the transition has been much slower in 
Tanzania compared to some other countries in Africa.  
 
From this perspective, the importance of enduring peasant production in Tanzania is 
that because peasant production depends very little on the state, it is much more 
difficult for the state to have effective power over the bulk of society living in 
traditional agriculture. It is also more difficult for patron-client networks to mobilize 
society for supporting national reform agendas. This makes the Tanzanian state weak 
vis-à-vis society as a whole, but it also explains why factions within the state made up 
of intermediate classes and capitalist groups also have limited bargaining power 
against each other within the framework of a state that does not penetrate most of 
society. 
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As well as the limited transformation of agriculture, the level of industrial 
development that occurred during the colonial period was very limited, even 
compared to Uganda and Kenya. State capacities to manage industrialization were 
therefore not a priority and very few Africans were engaged in commerce, trade or 
industry at the time of independence. In fact, there was a policy of active 
discouragement of African business by the colonial state. The state restricted access to 
credit to Africans through the 1923 Credit to Natives Law which required that loans to 
Africans be approved by a colonial administrative officer (McCarthy 1982) meaning 
effectively that lenders to Africans had no legal recourse to reclaim their debt and 
were inhibited from lending by extensive red tape. The prominent role of Asian 
Tanzanians in the private sector today was partly a result of colonial economic policy. 
The distance between Tanzania’s big capitalists (who are by and large not black 
African) and the state can help to explain why industrial policy in the past has largely 
been about trying to develop a (black African) public sector. This contrasts sharply 
with the carrot and stick (conditional rent) strategies to assist the technological 
progress of domestic capitalists seen in many of the successful Asian countries.  
 
The state capacities that developed during the colonial period were consistent with the 
very limited rents created and interventions engaged in by the colonial authority. 
These capacities were predominantly in low-level administration (McCarthy; 1982), 
agricultural extension services directed initially towards settler farms and peasant 
agriculture, and in basic education to provide a flow of African staff to junior ranks in 
the civil service (Coulson; 1981). The most important impact on emerging governance 
structures was the decision to implement a system of indirect rule from 1924.  
 
Indirect rule was seen as a route to stability though the co-option of local elites into 
the colonial organizational framework. This process involved the identification of 
tribal chiefs by the colonial authorities. However, across Tanzania, tribe had always 
been just one of the competing forms of identity to which people subscribed, rather 
than the defining characteristic of the society (Iliffe 1979). Despite this effort to 
consolidate the tribal system, the fragmented nature of Tanzanian tribes, and the post-
colonial nation building under President Nyerere meant that tribal divisions have 
always played a relatively minor role in Tanzanian politics. 
 
 38
The institutional authority of indirect rule depended both on the underlying coercive 
power of the colonial system and on the social control that native authorities had over 
tax revenue at a local level. Some, at least, of these tax revenues were used as an early 
form of technology enhancing rents, and were used to improve access to land and 
agricultural inputs. The expenditures had some technical success in terms of 
improving the productivity of peasant agriculture in some areas (Illife; 1974), but they 
also had a function of ensuring local acquiescence with the colonial authority. Local 
chiefs who acted as patrons distributed transfer rents to those in the locality who 
presented the largest potential threat to the stability of colonial rule. The budgets of 
native authorities were, however, extremely limited and hardly stretched beyond the 
salary bill of the bureaucrats administering them.  
 
The scope of the rents and capacity of the native authorities were too limited to be 
able to bring about the larger scale of economic transformation increasingly 
demanded by wealthier peasants and the small group of African traders and civil 
servants who were the backbone of the nationalist movement. As a result, on 
independence, the system of rent distribution through native authorities was largely 
swept away. However, the focus on strengthening a decentralized and traditional 
power system meant that on independence, the core state capacities needed to bring 
about the type of social transformation that was at the heart of the nationalist agenda 
were weakly formed. 
 
The nationalist movement was a broad-based coalition, yet, as in other colonized 
countries, its leaders were mainly from intermediate social groups rather than poor 
smallholders. They were primarily teachers, junior civil servants and the richer 
peasants who were engaged in co-operatives or trading. The common ties within this 
group were their close contacts with the colonial state itself as well as their higher 
level of education that set them apart from the traditional bonds of the village and 
gave them the organizational skills to mount a successful nationalist campaign.  
 
The institutional strength of the nationalist movement came from the highly structured 
organization of the Tanganyika Africa National Union (TANU) which became the 
Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in 1977 following the union between Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar. This organization originated from the urban-intellectual African 
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Association, established in 1929. By the time of independence, it had grown into a 
successful mass party. TANU was led by Julius Nyerere who saw the party as the 
main vehicle for bringing about development in Tanzania. In 1962, Nyerere stood 
down from the position of president in order to focus his attention on strengthening 
the party. Under Nyerere the party became centralized and highly structured with 
party organs at all levels of society from village cells of 10 households up to the 
National Executive Committee (NEC).  
 
Structurally, the institutions of the party held precedence over the institutions of the 
state. For instance, the National Assembly was constitutionally subordinate to the 
governing party while policy discussion took place primarily in party sub-groups 
rather than in parliament (Coulson; 1981). In 1965, Tanzania became a one-party 
state, further consolidating the role of the party as the central vehicle driving 
Tanzania’s development. In terms of organizational cohesiveness, the CCM also 
overshadowed other institutions of the state. Membership or association with the 
ruling party was a necessity for those competing for rents as there was, and still is, no 
credible political institution that rivals this position. Further, the low level of social 
and economic differentiation allowed the ruling party to achieve a high degree of 
inclusiveness at a relatively low cost in terms of rent distribution. The Leadership 
Code2 of the party went further, not only declaring limits to the rewards associated 
with rent seeking but also explicitly ruling out party leaders from capitalist 
associations. Given the relatively undifferentiated nature of most of the population 
who were not involved in any rapid accumulation, these declarations were initially 
fairly effective. While there was rent seeking during Nyerere’s rule, the costs were 
low as factional competition within the party structure was relatively limited 
compared to other developing countries. 
 
For the first five years of independence, the path of economic development in 
Tanzania continued along the lines established during colonial rule, with foreign 
ownership in industry and large-scale agriculture, continued growth of African 
                                                 
2 The Arusha Declaration Stated that “every TANU and government leader should .. in no way be 
associated with the practices of capitalism or feudalism” (Nyerere 1967: 36) and the Leadership Code 
barred party leaders and civil servants from owning shares in companies, renting property or engaging 
in private business. 
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capitalist farming and the dominance of Tanzanian Asians in trade and commerce. 
Yet the pressure to institute faster economic transformation for the benefit of the 
majority was growing. Together with Nyerere’s own Christian-Socialist ideals, this 
led to the adoption of a more radical approach to economic development. The Arusha 
Declaration of 1967 committed the party to Ujamaa based on a state-led ‘socialist’ 
economic transformation with strict limits on private sector accumulation and social 
differentiation.  
 
The declaration marks an important turning point in the nature of rent creation by the 
state and the associated rent seeking. The direct share of the state in the economy 
increased with the nationalization of banks and a large proportion of industry. 
Extensive administrative resource allocation and price controls, import quotas and 
foreign exchange rationing system were introduced. By the late 1970s, permits were 
introduced to control the internal movement of goods and state trading agencies in 
both international trade and domestic retail were established. The villagization 
scheme was a radical attempt to settle a shifting agricultural population into sedentary 
agriculture with cooperative landholdings in order to bring about an egalitarian form 
of agricultural transition. This involved the consolidation, often by force, of 80% of 
the rural population into co-operative villages, discussed further in section B.3.iii.  
 
The purpose of these diverse interventions and the associated rent-creation was to 
bring about rapid capacity enhancement and productivity growth in agriculture and 
industry without the unequalizing pressures of capitalist development that, in 
Tanzania, would have favoured the already established Asian and European business 
against the newly emerging African ‘middle class’. This helps to explain why the state 
took on the role of accumulation and distributed rents to state and party functionaries, 
primarily through the creation of parastatal institutions that created jobs for the new 
African constituencies and received subsidies and cheap credit from the state. Gross 
investment, mainly through donor and government funding, as a percentage of GDP 
increased from an average of 13.7% during 1961–67 to 24% during 1968–78.  
 
The policies had a positive impact in terms of building up the productive capacity of 
the economy, with an increase in manufacturing value added from 15.8% in 1965 to 
25.2% in 1970. However, by the end of the 1970s it was clear that ujamaa policies 
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were running into difficulties. The fundamental problem was that the state was not 
effectively managing the rents transferred to new industries to ensure productivity 
growth. There was a proliferation of poorly performing parastatals, excess 
employment and excess capacity in industry. To make matters worse, concessionary 
donor finance funded some of the rents going to failing enterprises, and this continued 
for almost a decade even after privatization began.  
 
This failure was partly due to weak technical state capacities in terms of 
understanding the needs and challenges of industrialization. More fundamentally, 
those within the state who wanted viable industries clearly lacked the power to 
provide credible threats to bureaucrats running industries, such as the threat to remove 
subsidies if they failed to achieve the productivity required for economic viability. 
This is not surprising given the fragmentation of power within the state and the 
absence of constituencies that could provide effective political power to modernizing 
leaders. Even though competing factions were weak in Tanzania, no faction or leader 
was strong enough to impose discipline on the others. As discussed in part A, 
factional groupings are a common feature of the politics of developing countries and 
often coalesce around ethnic, religious or tribal identities. In Tanzania, however the 
factional groupings are much more fluid, partly because of the very limited rural 
transformation, which meant that an established rural elite did not exist who could 
play the role of rural political entrepreneurs. This resulted in the paradox of Tanzanian 
politics that the centre was strong enough to keep virtually every faction together in 
the same party, but even the centre was too weak to impose discipline on all the 
factions benefiting from ujama development policies. We will discuss the 
implications of this political structure further in sections B.3.ii and B.3.v. 
 
The failure of its industrialization strategy was put into sharp focus by the fact that by 
the early 1980s Tanzania was facing a severe fiscal crisis3 and a foreign exchange 
constraint, which had a negative impact on the heavily import-dependent 
manufacturing sector. In addition, agricultural output decreased following 
villagization. The informal sector of the economy grew rapidly as the state’s capacity 
                                                 
3 The fiscal crisis resulted partly from the strain of financing Tanzania’s military intervention in 
Uganda to remove Iddi Amin. 
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to pay adequate wages and to enforce price regulations dwindled. In 1985 under the 
new leadership of President Mwinyi an agreement with the IMF was signed which 
heralded in a new approach to economic management.   
 
The liberalization programme was based on the assumption that the poor performance 
of the economy was mainly a result of extensive state interventions that had been 
implemented under ujamaa and the remedy was therefore to roll back the state, 
remove the rents associated with failing interventions and allow the market to allocate 
resources. This involved a shift to a market-determined exchange rate, price 
deregulation, removal of tariffs and subsidies and an extensive privatization 
programme. Restrictions on private accumulation and foreign investment slowly 
disappeared and the model of market-led development took the place of the 
egalitarian self-sufficiency of ujamaa.  
 
Reform of the political system led to multiparty elections in 1995 and a 
decentralization programme that has sought to push political power and service 
delivery down to the local level. Nevertheless, CCM still dominates the political scene 
and continues to win national elections, increasing its parliamentary representation to 
87.3% in the 2005 national elections. We discuss the implications of these political 
reforms for rents and rent seeking in section B.3.ii. 
 
Structural change during the twenty years of reform has been slow and faltering, 
although the pace has picked up since 1995. The weakest impact has been in 
agriculture. While certain crops such as tea, tobacco and cashews have improved as a 
result of export and price liberalization, other major crops such as coffee, cotton and 
maize have declined (IMF; 2004). Overall, there has been very little increase in 
agricultural productivity and wages. This is reflected in the fact that rural poverty 
levels have hardly changed over the reform period (URT; 2005).  
 
Growth in the manufacturing sector started to pick up after a sustained downturn and 
now accounts for 7.8% of GDP which is the same level as in the late 1980s and well 
below the 12% achieved in the 1970s. These aggregate figures hide the fact that while 
certain manufacturing industries have registered significant declines since 
liberalization such as garment and textiles, there has been a broad-based increase in 
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the output of a number of privatized industries including sugar, beer, soft drinks, 
cement and steel. We discuss the changing role of rents and rent seeking in 
manufacturing in section B.3.v. 
 
The most dramatic change in the structure of the Tanzanian economy has been the 
rapid growth of the mining sector. This was fuelled by the introduction of very 
favourable foreign investment regulations that triggered massive foreign investment 
since the late 1990s, making Tanzania the second highest recipient of FDI in Africa. 
Gold has now replaced agricultural products in terms of export value, accounting for 
around 60% of exports; yet according to the IMF (2004) the growth in mining has yet 
to contribute significantly to GDP growth. The growth in mining and the emergence 
of natural resource exploitation as a dynamic economic arena in Tanzania poses 
particular challenges to rent management systems that are discussed further in section 
B.3.iv. 
 
Despite the withdrawal of the state from many spheres of economic activity in 
Tanzania, the period of liberalization has also been associated with increasing 
concerns about corruption and weak governance. Further, continued aid dependency 
and the shift in aid delivery to general budget support has heightened donor fears 
about the financial probity of government. Within Tanzania, the Presidential 
Commission of Inquiry Against Corruption, undertaken in 1996 found that “there is 
no doubt that corruption is rampant in all sectors of the economy, public services and 
politics in the country” (URT 1996, p 46) and in 2005 Transparency International 
ranked Tanzania as 96th out of 158 countries surveyed (TI; 2005). Far from 
liberalization leading to a reduction in corruption, the indications are that corruption 
in Tanzania is getting entrenched, if not increasing. In the subsequent sections we 
argue that examining different types of corruption in the country gives an insight into 
critical areas of state weakness, and in particular the limits of the current growth path. 
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B.3. Critical areas for anti-corruption policy and implications for strengthening 
pro-poor growth capacities of the Tanzanian government. 
 
In this section, we look at a number of areas where observers and policy-makers 
frequently identify corruption as a serious problem in Tanzania. These include the 
drivers of bureaucratic corruption and of political corruption. In addition, we look at 
corruption in the key areas of land and property rights reform, corruption in the 
critical natural resource sector, and the implications of corruption for any type of 
transformative industrial policy. We argue that closer analysis of these areas shows 
the complexity of the problem and the interlocking of different types of corruption 
using the framework developed in Section A. We then discuss the implications of this 
analysis for anti-corruption policy. 
 
i) Bureaucratic Corruption  
Through our interviews and in our reading of the secondary literature on Tanzania it 
was clear that bureaucratic corruption is widespread in Tanzania. Evidence suggests 
that bureaucratic corruption is rampant in Tanzania across many areas of state activity 
including law enforcement, courts and taxation as well as service delivery in health 
and education. This corruption occurs at all levels of the bureaucratic structure. But 
even petty bureaucratic corruption has a disproportionate impact on the poor by 
raising the costs that they face in receiving services from the state. The Warrioba 
Commission of 1996 and subsequent reports on corruption in Tanzania such as that of 
the World Bank (2001) have extensively documented bureaucratic corruption in forms 
such as demands for bribes, the embezzlement of public resources and extortion by 
low-level state officials. 
 
The impact of bureaucratic corruption on public expenditure and the tax system has 
been a major area of concern for the Tanzanian Government and development 
partners alike. Petty (and sometimes not so petty) bureaucratic corruption affecting 
public finances have been addressed through tighter monitoring of the budgetary 
process, the implementation of computerized financial tracking systems and through 
the on-going Public Expenditure Review process, strongly supported and financed by 
donors including DFID. However, considerable leakage persists at the level of actual 
service delivery.  
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 Bureaucratic corruption within the revenue system includes the false classification 
and valuation of goods to avoid excise, sales or customs taxes, payment of bribes to 
tax officers, extortion by tax officers, sometimes using inflated tax claims, outright 
fraud and the embezzlement of collected revenue (Fjeldstad; 2002). Such corruption 
leads to a significant erosion of the tax base and leakage of much needed revenue in 
Tanzania as in many other developing countries.  
 
Using the categories of Figure 1 in Section A, some of this bureaucratic corruption is 
clearly market-restricting corruption (Type 1). These acts of corruption relate to 
underlying state functions that are legal but which are socially damaging in design, 
such as the continuation of legal impediments and rules that serve no purpose but 
which allow the collection of bribes from citizens who need to work their way around 
the system (World Bank; 2001). Thus in these areas the policy prescription is based 
on reducing the unnecessary regulation while raising the opportunity cost of being 
caught by increasing salaries and enhancing accountability and transparency.  
 
However, much of the bureaucratic corruption in Tanzania is also state-constraining 
corruption (Type 2 in Figure 1). In particular, the loss of public resources in the tax 
system is largely of this type. In principle, the focus of the public finance anti-
corruption agenda addresses the problem of corruption affecting necessary state 
functions through measures such as the Civil Service Reform Programme, the Public 
Financial Management Reform Programme, the Public Expenditure Review, Legal 
Sector Reform Programme and Accountability, Transparency and Integrity 
Programmes. However, a major limitation with these programmes is the implicit 
donor analysis of the state functions that are considered beneficial. The new 
consensus is that necessary and beneficial state functions are essentially limited to 
service delivery, particularly to the poor, as well as some infrastructure construction 
in areas that cannot be provided by private sector providers. This means that Civil 
Service Reform, PFM and transparency measures are all aimed at reducing the state’s 
functions to a core set of service delivery activities and then concentrating on 
reducing corruption in these areas. Thus, while in principle the anti-corruption 
reforms described above address both Type 1 and Type 2 corruption, they address 
Type 2 (state-constraining) corruption by insisting that the range of essential state 
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activities is limited to a very narrow range. We will argue later that responding to 
state-constraining corruption by shrinking the scope of state activities that are deemed 
to be potentially beneficial can itself damage the prospects of growth, making the 
sustainable reduction of corruption more difficult.  
 
It is clear from the quarterly reports of Tanzania’s Anti-Corruption Bureau as well as 
the annual reports of the Controller and Auditor General that these strategies have at 
best had limited success. For example, following the extensive reform of the revenue 
authority in 1996, which focussed on raising salaries and providing greater 
transparency and accountability of tax officials, there was an initial decline in 
corruption and an increase in reported revenue from 11% of GDP in 1995/96 to more 
than 12% in 1996/97. However in the three subsequent years tax revenue declined as 
a percentage of GDP and there were reports of increasing corruption within the 
revenue authority (Fjeldstad et al; 2003). Tax revenues as a percentage of GDP started 
to rise again after 2000 yet the tax to GDP ratio remains low compared to other 
African countries with a similar economic structure. One explanation for this is the 
continued prevalence of exemptions granted at customs as well as VAT exemptions.  
Reducing exemptions has been a central focus of the economic reform programme, 
monitored by the IMF, and there has been a reduction since 2000 in the total number 
of exemptions, particularly at a customs level, as well as a shift away from giving 
exemptions directly to private sector companies and individuals.  Nevertheless, there 
has been a sharp increase in exemptions given via the Tanzania Investment Centre, 
from 12.6% of total exemptions in 1999 to 37.4% in 2004 (Levin; 2005).    
 
One reason why even such narrowly defined anti-corruption strategies have failed is 
that they ignore the interdependence of different types of corruption. Bureaucratic 
corruption is not just due to the drivers of market-restricting and state-constraining 
corruption, but also by the other two sets of drivers of corruption. In particular, 
bureaucrats are often involved in political corruption (Type 3 corruption in Figure 1) 
where the driver is the resource demand coming from political masters. If politicians 
need to raise money for running parties or maintaining their support base of clients, 
they may involve bureaucrats in scams or in allocating resources to favoured clients. 
Bureaucrats may benefit from such corruption, but the conventional strategies 
described above are unlikely to work if political imperatives are driving the 
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corruption. We can expect politicians to protect the concerned bureaucrats even while 
they pay lip service to anti-corruption strategies. Moreover, if political survival 
requires these funds, transparency in one area will drive political corruption into other 
areas. Not only are conventional strategies of salary increases, transparency, and 
limiting state activity to core service delivery areas unlikely to reduce overall 
corruption in this context, if conventional sources of rent for political redistribution in 
patron-client networks begin to delivery up, politicians are likely to seek new areas in 
which rent can be collected. We will see later that in Tanzania greater efforts in 
reducing corruption in budgetary processes (an area where donors have particular 
concerns in the context of GBS) have directed attention away from growing 
corruption in areas such as land allocation and natural resource licensing.  
 
The evidence of bureaucratic corruption in Tanzania suggests that some bureaucratic 
corruption is of the predatory variety (Type 4 corruption in Figure 1), driven by weak 
or collapsing central control over lower level state employees. Although Tanzania 
clearly does not suffer from serious versions of predation, some of the petty 
corruption in Tanzania, in particular involving the police, have all the characteristics 
of predation and theft and relate to the failure of central agencies of the state to 
discipline its lower level staff even when their activities harm the state. Predatory 
variants of bureaucratic corruption are also not much affected by transparency 
reforms, as the problem here is not the lack of information about corruption but rather 
the inability of the central state to discipline public employees. There is informal 
evidence that predatory corruption is increasing in Tanzania, partly related to the 
institutional weakening of the state since the end of the 1970s and the on-going fiscal 
constraints that are limiting its effectiveness. The policy response here has to be to 
strengthen central state institutions through investment in human and infrastructural 
capital. The political fragmentation of the state is a more fundamental problem 
particularly as the wider processes of economic differentiation that are occurring in 
Tanzania are likely to heighten factional politics and increasingly stress the centripetal 
influence of the CCM party. 
 
The capacity of state to maintain effective control over its operatives typically closely 
correlates with the ability of the state to impose order in society. In other words, 
societies where lower-level public officials begin to engage in predatory activities are 
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also societies where lawlessness is rising and private mafias begin to engage in open 
extortion and theft. Maintaining social order is not merely a function a state’s ability 
to enforce security. The capacity of a state to impose discipline also depends on its 
legitimacy, which in turn depends on its ability to deliver growth in living standards 
to wide constituencies. Although Tanzania has achieved a higher rate of growth over 
the last decade, much of the country has not enjoyed the benefits of this growth 
process. This is because the new growth sectors of mining, minerals and tourism do 
not offer the widespread linkages and employment opportunities generated by the 
manufacturing sector. Thus, growth in these areas can only benefit the wider 
population if government can tax firms in these sectors and redistribute resources to 
others. Clearly, the prospects of doing this on a grand scale in a poor country hoping 
to attract foreign investment are limited. In contrast, manufacturing led growth has 
immediate effects on poverty reduction through job creation. This could help explain 
why social fragmentation appears to be increasing in Tanzania despite relatively high 
rates of growth, and with the growth of social divisions, it is not surprising that we 
found evidence in interviews and in the secondly literature of a decline in the 
effectiveness of the state in maintaining social order. This highlights the importance 
of focusing on feasible areas for manufacturing growth in countries like Tanzania, not 
only to achieve a more rapid pace of growth, but also to ensure that the state’s 
legitimacy, and through that its effectiveness in maintaining social discipline is 
maintained.  
 
ii) Political Corruption 
Unlike bureaucratic corruption, it is much more difficult to get evidence of political 
corruption in Tanzania, compared to neighbouring countries like Kenya. We believe 
that this is only partly because political corruption may actually be less serious in 
Tanzania. The lower intensity of political competition in Tanzania because of the 
relative underdevelopment of the rural elite may have contributed to a more muted 
factional competition, and this in turn would reduce the demands for raising funds by 
political parties to keep their factions together. In addition, it is also likely that much 
of the redistribution to political factions that happens openly in countries like Kenya, 
happens within the closed domain of the CCM in Tanzania, making it difficult for 
outsiders to report on it. We would expect evidence of political corruption in Tanzania 
to become more widely available as political competition moves outside the CCM as 
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multi-party politics becomes entrenched. Once this happens, and competition with 
opposition parties intensifies, we expect the ruling party to ‘buy’ factions from the 
opposition more openly than it has needed to in the past. This is likely to result in both 
an increase in political corruption as well as making some of the existing political 
corruption more transparent to journalists and outside observers.  
 
As in many other developing countries political corruption in Tanzania involves 
raising funds through corruption for off-budget transfers to patron-client networks 
linked to the state. There is some evidence from our correspondents that these funds 
are used directly to purchase votes in national and local elections and also for on-
going political stabilization not related to elections. This evidence suggests that 
political corruption (Type 3 corruption in Figure 1) does exist in Tanzania. Tanzania 
has maintained a high degree of political stability since independence suggesting that 
the political stabilization that occurs through payoffs to different factions within the 
ruling party CCM has been relatively effective. As outlined in section B.2, it is clear 
that the institutional strength of the CCM party has helped to maintain political 
stability by lowering the costs of factional transfers. In Tanzania, political 
stabilization has so far involved keeping fluid patron-client networks with relatively 
similar levels of bargaining power within the CCM structure. This helps to explain 
why the cases of political corruption that make headline news in Kenya have been less 
prevalent in Tanzania as in Kenya the greater power of different political groupings 
outside the currently ruling party provide a much greater threat to state stability. 
These external factions can therefore demand higher levels of payoffs in Kenya than 
in Tanzania, but this may change in the future as suggested above.    
 
While Tanzania has clearly achieved political stability since independence, this has 
not led overall to a higher level of state effectiveness as there is an important 
distinction between inclusive politics and strong party politics. The CCM party in 
Tanzania has historically been an inclusive organization that has been able to contain 
factional competition through its well-developed and inclusive institutional structures 
in a political context where political entrepreneurs are not very powerful given the 
low level of economic differentiation and development. Further, the low level of 
social differentiation and weak economic transition has paradoxically reduced the 
costs of political competition given the existence of an inclusive one-party state that is 
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still effectively a one-party state despite the beginnings of multi-party competition. So 
far, at least, the ability of different factions in the business community and within the 
state to mobilize broader social groups to demand or protect rents has been very 
limited. Clientelist political corruption in Tanzania therefore ensures that the centre 
remains stable through internal redistribution to diffuse power networks even though 
the centre itself lacks the political power to act as a strong state.  
 
One of the few well-documented cases of grand political corruption in Tanzania 
supports our hypothesis on the processes through which the CCM maintains political 
power in Tanzania. This case involved a large power supply contract signed in 1995 
between the IPTL company and the Government (Cooksey; 2002). At the time, the 
electricity industry in Tanzania was just opening up to private providers, and 
negotiations with Songas for production of electricity from gas reserves in southern 
Tanzania was under way with TANESCO, Tanzania’s publicly owned electricity 
supplier.  IPTL was a Malaysian consortium backed by Tanzanians well connected 
with the CCM.  The IPTL contract was never put out to tender but was agreed through 
bilateral negoations. The IPTL company proposed to produce electricity from 
imported diesel, with a promise of eventual conversion to gas. From the evidence 
reported in Cooksey (2002) and from Gratwick et al (2006) it is clear that despite the 
fact that it soon emerged that the agreement was significantly over priced and not in 
the economic interests of the country, the top leadership was not able to override the 
networks within the party who supported the deal. The eventual outcome is that 
Tanzania is locked into a costly twenty year agreement with IPTL whose charges are 
almost double those of Songas4. As Gratwick et al (2006) point out, IPTL also has the 
highest costs of construction per kilowatt compared to other independent power 
producers of similar size and technology in other developing countries.  
 
The deal is interesting because it allows us to examine, however tentatively, 
alternative hypotheses about the internal operation of the CCM. From the outset, the 
IPTL deal faced strong opposition from technocrats in the Ministry of Energy who 
were convinced that it did not offer a good deal to Tanzania. Even after the contract 
                                                 
4 This is despite the fact that Songas capacity charge is comprehensive of the large scale gas 
infrastructure investment.  Further, IPTL power generation has not been converted to much cheaper gas 
fuel as stipulated in the original agreement. 
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was signed, pressure from these groups and the Prevention of Corruption Bureau led 
the government to authorize a referral of the case to the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes in London. This could have resulted in the 
arbitrators changing or overturning the contract in London, but interestingly at the last 
minute, it appears President Mkapa who had allowed the case to go forward in the 
first place, prevented the disclosure of all information to the arbitration tribunal, and 
TANESCO lost its appeal. The question that arises in the analysis of this deal is why 
the competitors who offered better tariffs lost out.  
 
One possibility is that IPTL was offering a bigger bribe to political managers within 
the CCM than their competitors. The fact that the CCM could stick to the contract 
despite public knowledge of the inferior deal suggests that it has sufficient political 
control over competing factions who could not exploit a potentially major scandal to 
their own advantage. The more interesting question is why the CCM failed to change 
the supplier or the contract in the light of all the information that became available in 
the course of the disclosures. The argument that this was possibly because of an 
implicit bribe that the company had paid can only be part of the explanation. We have 
to assume that more efficient competitors were unwilling to match the bribe, and we 
have no evidence of this. Some kickbacks are common in the international power 
contracting business. Unless IPTL had offered an absolutely incredible kickback, and 
again we have no evidence that it did, this episode also suggests that the CCM is in 
fact relatively weak when it comes to upsetting the internal applecart once factions 
have come to an agreement about how to share a kickback.  
 
To understand why, consider how corruption operates in dynamic Asian countries like 
China. There too, private power suppliers compete in the domestic market to construct 
power plants and there is a lot of evidence that the political leadership of the CCP 
demand and get significant kickbacks. But the power sector in China is relatively 
efficient and the political leadership have no incentive in allowing inefficient power 
suppliers to get contracts. Why is that? Essentially, the CCP in China as the only party 
around expects to be in power for a long time, and therefore it has no incentive of 
making a very big cut on one project that is detrimental to its long-term prospects of 
collecting from many efficient projects. Even for a single project, a well-run and 
profitable project is likely to pay more in kickbacks over time than a project that is not 
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(even ignoring all the other benefits to a government coming from well-run profitable 
projects). Thus, in countries like China, political corruption operates like an additional 
tax that is never set high enough to deter efficient projects that the state requires for its 
long-term viability and for maximizing its kickbacks over time. In this respect, we 
could also have expected the CCM in Tanzania as the dominant party in an effectively 
one-party system to take a long-term view, and withdraw support from a project that 
was clearly detrimental to its long-term prospects. It is no small achievement to end 
up with one of the highest electricity tariff rates in Africa.  
 
Indeed, we saw plenty of evidence of disputes at the highest levels of the Tanzanian 
state on the wisdom of the project, and evidence that initially President Mkapa 
allowed the contract to be referred to the London arbitration. This suggests to us a 
deeper problem that could possibly distinguish the CCM from the Chinese CCP, and 
that is the inability of the executive to enforce decisions on internal factions. 
Changing the contract would possibly have changed the distribution of benefits within 
the CCM involving some losers, in particular the individuals close to the Tanzanians 
supporting the IPTL deal. While the CCM may well have been better off overall by 
going with the alternative contract, those who lost out would have to be contained and 
their opposition dealt with. The late stage at which the president backed off from 
supporting international arbitration suggests an internal weakness in this respect, and 
this would distinguish the CCM from strong parties like the CCP, which are able to 
take difficult decisions and impose them on internal factions that lose out in the 
interests of the collective interests of the party. This analysis is necessarily 
speculative, but we believe it is the most consistent with the facts.  
 
Thus, our conclusion is that the diffuse power structure within the CCM leads to the 
appearance of centralized power in Tanzania, as there appear to be few solid blocks 
of opposition within the party. The apparent party strength also relates to the fact that 
opposition from CCM factions within parliament is muted due to the punitive 
mechanisms available to the party whip (Mmuya; 1998) and the fact that most of the 
important decisions on rents occur outside parliamentary debate. Nevertheless, 
evidence of the type documented above also suggests that while factions are weak, so 
is the central power, and it is difficult for the leadership to override internal factions 
that emerge on an ad hoc basis when big rents and transfers are at stake. If the centre 
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could impose its will on the party as a whole, corruption would not necessarily 
decline but the state would be more effective in ensuring that such efficient and 
profitable service providers were selected.  
 
This analysis has implications for the deepening of multi-party democracy in 
Tanzania. Multi-party democracy will not necessarily lead to even more short-term 
decisions if at least one of the contending parties is strong and can hope to gain 
political dividends and extend its stay in power by moderating its extraction and 
selecting efficient projects. So far, the impact of multi-party democracy has been very 
limited in mainland Tanzania in terms of political stability and patterns of rent 
seeking. This is mainly because opposition parties have hardly made a dent on CCMs 
hegemonic position and in fact, the CCM has increased its parliamentary 
representation from 78% in the first multiparty elections in 1995 to 87.3% in 2005. 
Further, Kelsall (2003) reports that the advent of multiparty elections has actually led 
to decreased competition in around 13% of seats as under the one-party system the 
CCM fielded multiple candidates while now the weak opposition parties cannot afford 
to stand candidates in all seats.  
 
The one area where CCM has faced serious opposition is in Zanzibar from the CUF 
party. In Zanzibar, factional politics has coalesced around regional identities causing 
greater political cleavages that have spilled over into social unrest and violence during 
elections. Nevertheless, CCM has managed to maintain the union through 
organizational and coercive strength and more recently through the manipulation of 
divisions between elites on the main island Unguja and those in Pemba.   
 
However, there have been important changes in the nature of political representation 
and political rent seeking in Tanzania since liberalization that we cannot explain 
simply in terms of the emergence of multiparty politics. It has been argued that 
multiparty elections have caused an increase in the costs of competing in elections 
(Kelsall and Mmuya; 2005) as well as heightening the importance of local level 
power networks for political representatives and requirements for service delivery by 
MPs to local constituents (Gibbon, 2004; Kiondo, 1995; Kelsall 2000). Kelsall (2000) 
has described this as a process of “districtization” as rent seeking associated with 
political corruption has descended to districts. However, we believe that we cannot 
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say that the evidence of growing political corruption is the result of the growth of 
multiparty politics. This is because all the evidence suggests that the real threat of 
political opposition in Tanzania remains very weak. We would rather explain the 
evidence of growing political corruption in terms of the growing significance in 
Tanzania of primitive accumulation, which is the other variant of Type 3 corruption 
described in Figure 1.  
 
The opening up of the accumulation process and the private sector under liberalization 
has enhanced the role of politics in primitive accumulation processes particularly 
where traditional structures of production are in the process of collapse (discussed 
further in section B.3.iii). The increasing evidence of political competition and 
corruption are more likely to be a reflection of the growing opportunities available to 
political representatives in managing the non-market transfers and allocations of 
assets like land and natural resources. These changes in political opportunities are also 
reflected in the fact that the socio-economic background of candidates has been 
changing away from lower income teachers and farmers towards richer private sector 
candidates (Kiondo; 1990, 1995). In our analysis, whether Type 3 corruption will 
prevail in politics and lead to a more rapid pace of capitalist transition or whether 
such accumulation will become predatory Type 4 corruption depends very much on 
the ability of the state to limit further political fragmentation in the face of growing 
demands and economic differentiation. The logic here is very similar to the one 
discussed above where a weak state with powerful internal fragmentation can lead to 
poor project selection. Such a state is also unable to resist asset grabbing by political 
entrepreneurs and factions that are predatory, whereas a strong and coherent state is 
able to respond to the pressures for non-market asset transfers by ensuring that assets 
go to productive users who improve the sustainability of the ruling political group.  
 
Development partners can have an important influence on whether these processes of 
non-market transfers described as political corruption and primitive accumulation 
(Type 3 in Figure 1) evolve into predatory corruption (Type 4). While both are 
undesirable, the latter is much worse. Tanzania is heavily aid dependent and direct 
budget support from donors now accounts for 20% of total budget expenditures, and 
around half of the total aid flow. This has been accompanied by a process of financial 
reform which has opened up the budgeting process to greater scrutiny by development 
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partners through forums such as the PER and annual PRBS/PRSC review. This 
greater level of transparency for development partners may reduce some corruption 
associated with Type 1 and Type 2 corruption processes but paradoxically, greater 
external control over budgetary resources that does not take into account the 
necessary processes of political stabilization may force the state to achieve political 
stabilization by increasingly engaging in predatory extraction. In other words, an 
unintended effect of greater external control of the budget may be to convert some 
Type 3 corruption associated with political stabilization into Type 4 predatory 
corruption. While we cannot demonstrate this at this early stage, we are concerned at 
the evidence of greater predatory behaviour at the lowest levels of politics, with urban 
politicians shifting their sphere of interest from central CCM politics to political 
corruption and entrepreneurship at the local level.  
 
In addition, development partners have played a key role in the process of formulating 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (Gould and Ojanen; 2003) and its successor the 
National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, known by its Kiswahili 
acronym MKUKUTA, which sets out the targets for public expenditure to achieve 
poverty reduction. One of the underlying features of these strategy papers is the idea 
that the capacity of the state to implement its development policy can be enhanced 
with greater inclusion of social stakeholders into a poverty reduction strategy 
formulation process. This type of public discussion inevitably results in the 
identification of pro-poor spending targets that donors are comfortable with but they 
ignore the critical requirements of political stabilization in the typical developing 
country context which requires political transfers and redistribution to relatively more 
powerful intermediate class groups. After all, it is very difficult in any developing 
country context to publicly articulate that the danger to the political stability of a 
society comes not from the very poor (who deserve service delivery on welfare 
maximizing grounds) but rather from the intermediate classes who can easily disrupt 
political stability if powerful factions are not accommodated. If the capacity of the 
CCM to accommodate these groups through budgetary processes declines over time, 
they will still have to be accommodated, but the accommodation will happen through 
other processes such as allowing factions to engage in land-grabbing or in mediating 
resource contracts that may be more damaging for long run development. This is not 
an argument for budgetary opacity, but rather an argument for realising that 
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corruption has many dimensions and a narrow interpretation can inadvertently do 
more harm than good. One response to this problem may be to assist developing 
countries like Tanzania deal realistically with political stabilization effectively 
through other measures.  
 
iii) Land and Primitive Accumulation 
Land is still the most important productive asset for most households in Tanzania yet 
land ownership is increasingly subject to turmoil linked to corruption and theft 
associated with processes that in Part A we described as primitive accumulation. Part 
of the reason for the growing concerns of governance in this area is that Tanzania’s 
agrarian structure has long been characterised by relative stability and equality in land 
ownership, with a gini co-efficient of land inequality of 0.35 in the 1980s (Ghai and 
Radwan; 1984).  
 
There are numerous historical reasons for the stability and relative equality of land 
ownership. During the colonial era, the Land Ordinance of 1923 established a dual 
approach to land law. Among peasants and pastoralists land ownership was 
established through membership of a “native” community. These “customary” 
ownership rights had no legal protection through the colonial State (Tenga; 1995) 
while the land rights of the new settlers, plantation owners and residents of urban 
areas were provided with legal protection, were controlled by statute and required 
documentary proof in the form of title deeds. But the state held ultimate ownership 
and control of all lands as well as the legal powers to alienate lands from peasants to 
new settlers, for instance on the basis that it was not in productive use under peasant 
ownership.  
 
As outlined in section B.2, despite the coercive abilities of the colonial administration 
and native authority structures, it is clear that the colonial state was unable to bring 
about substantive change in land rights either in favour of settlers or of African 
capitalist farmers. This was particularly evidence in the aftermath of the Meru land 
case in 1952i where peasants and the fledgling nationalist movement successfully 
opposed a planned expropriation of peasant land for new settler farmers. Thus despite 
the de jure ownership of all land by the state, the power of the colonial government to 
effect larger scale expropriation of peasant land was limited by the growing 
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organizational strength of the nationalist movement and its power base amongst rural 
peasants.  
 
A further example is the resistance mounted by the nationalist movement through 
TANU towards the proposals for changing the land laws to permit individual freehold 
in 1958. While in Kenya nationalists campaigned for years for freehold rights, the 
nationalists in Tanzania resisted this late colonial policy. Such laws would have 
hastened rural differentiation and led to the emergence of a stratum of richer 
peasantry that the nationalist movement saw as unacceptable. Within the structure of 
the economy at that time, the number of richer African farmers who could have 
benefited from this law was extremely limited and it was perceived that the only 
group who would benefit from a capitalist land market were the European and Asian 
farmers at the expense of the non-capitalist peasants.  
 
Thus, the problems constraining low transaction cost land markets in developing 
countries in general were more glaringly obvious in Tanzania at the time of 
independence, since here basic property rights in land were much less developed 
compared to many developing countries. After independence, land reform took on a 
new path with the policy of villagization. This involved the expropriation of large 
landowners and the distribution of land to village based co-operatives. A secondary 
objective was to create a settled village population in a context where this did not yet 
exist. Despite the fact that around 13 million people who had previously lived in 
scattered and often shifting settlements were relocated to ujamaa villages, the overall 
redistribution of land was relatively small and it was widely observed that richer 
peasants within the villages were able to acquire land that was intended for communal 
use. 
 
Thus by the time of liberalization a process of land accumulation, often involving 
illegal transfers of rights to powerful constituents at the village level was already 
under way. The new land laws that were enacted in 1999 were intended to address the 
competing pressures generated by the emergence of land markets on one hand and 
security of tenure for small-scale peasant farmers on the other. The debate over the 
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future direction of land reform in Tanzania continuous to this day5. The Presidential 
Commission on Land Reform under Professor Shivji provided strong 
recommendations for providing greater security for peasant land rights at the village 
level while the approach of the Ministry of Lands and numerous consultants was to 
strengthen the rights of new investors in land (Shivji; 1998).  
 
These contradictory pressures led to the failure of the state to clearly define a land 
policy that would achieve equity while at the same time promoting efficiency by 
allowing new more productive forms of land ownership to emerge. Efficiency in 
landholding also requires creating a minimum size of farm where the new owners are 
big enough to leverage the capital required to achieve high quality and productivity to 
compete in an increasingly globalized world. Far from achieving these ends, the 
actual implementation of ‘land reform’ is not occurring under the clear guidance of 
the state but rather through the actions of private individuals engaging in illegal non-
market transfers. These are clearly a variant of the primitive accumulation described 
in Part A. As we described earlier, there are good theoretical reasons to expect these 
land transfers at early stages of development to have a large non-market component. 
The real question for countries like Tanzania is whether these transfers are likely to 
lead to the eventual emergence of a productive agricultural sector or not.   
 
Corruption is inevitably associated with the mediatory role that political entrepreneurs 
play in processes of non-market land transfers. If the underlying land transfers lead to 
the emergence of relatively productive users of land, the associated corruption would 
be of Type 3 (in Figure 1). But if the non-market transfers led to grabbing by 
speculators or individuals who had no ability or incentive to raise productivity, we 
would classify these as predatory transfers and the associated corruption would also 
be predatory (Type 4). More evidence on the changing patterns of land use is needed 
before we can reach a conclusion on the trends evolving in Tanzania. Our 
examination of the Tanzanian state does suggest, however, that the institutions of the 
state dealing with land allocation are relatively weak, opening up the possibility of 
                                                 
5 The future direction of land policy appear to have been set in the new land act and the establishment 
of an office under the President to implement de Soto’s recommendations on establishing property 
rights for small holders.   
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unproductive and therefore predatory non-market transfers of land. As described in 
the previous section, local elite groups appear to be tapping into the fragmented 
factions of the CCM to use local political influence to acquire land potentially for 
speculation rather than for productive use (Gibbon; 1995, 1996). This is exacerbated 
by the fact that the potential growth of tourism and natural resource extraction, 
including mining, encourages the speculative acquisition of land by political 
entrepreneurs and ‘business’ interests associated with them. 
 
The policy debate in Tanzania has been influenced by de Soto’s argument that if 
property rights, particularly for the poor, are strengthened, an efficient market will re-
allocate assets to maximize growth. In Part A and in our TSP review (Khan 2005a) we 
discuss a number of general reasons why this is an unattainable goal for developing 
countries. Given the very low productivity of peasant agriculture in Tanzania, the 
resources required for defining these rights effectively are simply not there. As a 
result, the realistic prospects are for a continuation of weak land rights and for land 
markets to have high transaction costs in the near future. In addition to the general 
reasons, in Tanzania the basic structure even of peasant land rights do not yet even in 
a weakly defined way. The policy implication of this is to strengthen the capability of 
the Ministry of Lands and the Tanzania Investment Centre, which manages the 
Tanzania Land Bank, to define national priorities in land allocation and then to carry 
out non-market land allocations (land reforms) according to these national priorities. 
Such a strategy will directly have an impact on the corruption associated with 
primitive accumulation by making the non-market land transfers transparent and 
following national priorities. It will still leave open the issue of accommodating 
powerful political factions at the local level, but this requires a political strategy as 
suggested at the end of our last section on political corruption in Tanzania.  
 
The political problem in achieving growth-enhancing land reform is to ensure that 
CCM, working with the Ministry of Lands can override local interests to allocate land 
in line with developmental goals. This would involve strengthening the non-market, 
and often-informal land allocation mechanisms to improve the capacity of state 
agencies to override local interests when they conflict with productive land use. The 
current process of land allocation in China provides a useful contrast to Tanzania’s 
land allocation process. The Chinese example suggests that land use and allocation 
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can be developmental even when land allocation is partly through non-market 
mechanisms (see the discussion of primitive accumulation in Part A) provided the 
state agencies have the institutional and political capacity to oversee and implement 
the allocation of land.  
 
iv) Natural resource rents 
The management of natural resource rents has become a crucial issue for Tanzania 
since liberalization as mining and tourism have become the fastest growing sectors of 
the economy. Tanzania is exceptionally well endowed with mineral resources and 
particularly gold, with the second largest gold reserves in Africa, after South Africa. 
Large-scale gold mining has a history in Tanzania dating back to the colonial period 
yet after independence large scale mining disappeared due to low world prices and the 
restrictions on investment by South African mining companies during the apartheid 
period. The rapid growth in mining under liberalization relates to the introduction of 
particularly favourable legislation to encourage foreign investment in mining. The 
initial legal changes in 1987 and in 1992 set royalties at 3% of income, the required 
government stake at 10% and set normal income tax levels. Yet while these changes 
attracted foreign companies, they initially had only a limited impact on investment. 
The foreign mining companies that initially entered Tanzania did not in general bring 
in large scale capital and instead focussed on extraction in older mines with new 
smaller scale technology and mining remained a predominantly artisanal activity with 
76% of mining undertaken by artisanal miners.  
 
The most significant increase in foreign direct investment into the mining sector 
occurred after the introduction of the new mining laws of 1998, which established the 
entitlement of private licence holders to use their mineral rights as collateral and to 
transfer mineral rights to banks or financial institutions without requiring ministerial 
approval or consent. This facilitated foreign financial institutions in acquiring mineral 
rights in Tanzania and led to a massive increase in investment into the mining sector, 
pushing Tanzania into the top three destinations for foreign direct investment in 
Africa.  
 
Given the potential revenue that governments can earn by claiming their share of 
natural resource rents, this sector raises important questions of rent management 
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capacity that are critical for accelerating economic development in countries like 
Tanzania. The most relevant rents the Government receives from the mining industry 
are in the form of royalties and corporate income tax. The 1998 Mining Act was 
extremely generous to investors, offering them a 3% royalty demand on gold, 30% 
income tax and no additional profit tax as well as indefinite carry-forward of losses. 
Corporate income tax returns from the mining industry have been very low, mainly 
due to the generous concessions through capital deductions and additional capital 
allowances that have meant that companies are not currently liable for tax due to their 
recent heavy capital investments. The potential future tax resources that will be 
generated by the mining companies is uncertain as the significant concessions will 
allow foreign mining companies to avoid tax liability for a considerable period.  
 
The weak capacity of the government to bargain for its share of Tanzania’s natural 
resource rents explains why although mining is the fastest growing sector and 
accounts for around 60% of total exports from Tanzania, it contributes only 3% of 
GDP (Treichel; 2005). There are clearly very strong incentives for politicians and 
bureaucrats to engage in corruption in the allocation of mineral rights, though we did 
not come across documentary evidence of this. Since the allocation and taxation of 
mineral rights is a necessary state function, any corruption that compromised these 
functions would be state-constraining corruption (type 2 in the classification of Figure 
1). Whether or not there is corruption in these state activities, weak state capacities are 
likely to lead to poor outcomes for countries like Tanzania in terms of extracting the 
best terms for a share of mineral rents. As we noted in Part A, if state capacities are 
strong and the regulatory agencies are able to identify the national interest, corruption 
would be a loss but would not upset the overall direction of natural resource policy. 
On the other hand, if state-constraining corruption was so severe that the allocation of 
licenses and the terms of allocation were significantly changed the result may be very 
damaging. This is particularly likely to happen in a context of weak state regulatory 
capacities, of factionalism within the state leading to short-term decision-making by 
factions in control of resource ministries. The policy response to this type of 
corruption and governance failure should be to strengthen state capacities to evaluate 
and pick the most efficient foreign investors and effectively impose productivity 
enhancing conditions upon them. The test of policy success would not necessarily be 
the absence of all corruption (which may be difficult to achieve in the short term) but 
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rather the observation of an effective resource policy that allowed the government to 
extract a large share of natural resource rents for national development.  
 
Donors are particularly concerned about the misuse of natural resource rents in 
developing countries and there is a considerable interest currently in international 
governance of multinational resource extraction companies. The hope is that if the 
limited transfers of royalties are made transparent African governments will be forced 
to use these for pro-poor redistribution. Such an expectation may be wrong for a 
number of reasons, not least that transparency alone does not confer effective power 
to the poor to claim these resources. Transparency could just as well result in more 
intense conflicts within intermediate class factions over resources rather than an 
allocation in favour of the poor. However, the problem for developing countries like 
Tanzania is even more serious, as they appear not to have states that can even ensure 
that a fair share of these natural resource rents revert to the country. In this context, 
economists like Amsden and Hikino (2005) have argued that African countries can 
learn a lot from the experience of OPEC and the state capacities that allowed oil-
exporting countries to capture a fair share of the oil rents for redistribution within 
their own countries. Amsden and Hikino point out that while many OPEC countries 
can be criticized for not using their natural resource rents to accelerate sustainable 
industrialization, they were (with a few glaring exceptions) very effective in using 
natural resource rents to significantly reduce and in many cases remove poverty. 
African countries with natural resources should perhaps be looking to the more 
successful OPEC countries to learn how to form cartels and construct the institutional 
and political capacity to manage high levels of income from natural resource rents. 
This would not be very popular in the industrialized countries, but higher prices of 
many natural resources are an excellent way of conserving their use and promoting a 
shift to greener technologies in advanced countries as well.  
 
It is important for development partners to plan for the fact that the scramble for 
natural resources is likely to intensify in the coming decades, with Chinese and 
eventually Indian resource companies entering Africa as major players and adding to 
the already great competitive pressures and political compromises involved in natural 
resource extraction. Realistically, the international governance of resource companies 
is unlikely to achieve significant results in this context. A rapid development of state 
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capacities to use natural resource rents for national development is required in African 
countries like Tanzania if these resources are not to be squandered. 
 
There is also evidence that the losses resulting from the weak regulation and rent-
sharing imposed on mining companies are compounded by leakages at a lower level 
through extensive smuggling and tax evasion (Chachage; 1995). These effects of 
corruption are quite different and this corruption is predatory (type 4) corruption. 
These types of corruption follow from the inability of the state to discipline its 
workers effectively. We discussed the appropriate policy responses to this type of 
governance failure in section B.3.i above.    
 
v) Industrial Policy 
Industrial policy has a poor reputation in Tanzania particularly as the ujamaa 
industrialization process, which led to the creation of the largest parastatal sector in 
Africa, was ineffective and costly. It is important to remember however that the 
industrialization efforts of the 1960s and 1970s led to a rapid accumulation of 
productive capacity some of which still survives following the extensive de-
industrialization of the 1980s. The unsuccessful industrial policy in Tanzania was due 
not only to poor policy design and to the deliberate exclusion of the private sector for 
reasons specific to the African and particularly Tanzanian experience. The failures 
also had a lot to do with weak institutional and political capacities of the state to 
discipline firms and managers receiving rents to accelerate technological learning and 
development.  
 
The corruption that was involved in these processes was a serious variant of state-
constraining corruption. Instead of abandoning all attempts at promoting industrial 
development, policy-makers in Tanzania should have learnt from that experience to 
use the private sector more extensively, even if it means assisting the emergence of a 
new black African capitalist class. In addition, the institutional and political 
weaknesses that prevented the state disciplining rent recipients during Nyerere’s time 
(and even today as in the IPTL example discussed above) needs to be addressed. The 
Asian experience suggests that this can be achieved even in the context of patron-
client politics and political corruption by creating a few ring-fenced institutions that 
can make allocations of resources that are critical for accelerating national 
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development. Paradoxically, the weakness of the state in removing subsidies even 
affects the capacity of the state to carry out liberalization regardless of the potential of 
liberalization to achieve rapid development in Tanzania. Thus, even after committing 
to the liberalization programme under the auspices of the IMF in 1985, the parastatal 
sector continued to expand and direct subsidies to parastatals increased to 11% of 
total government expenditure during the late 1980s.  
 
The new approach to industrial policy is to focus on market-constraining (Type 1) 
corruption and to attempt to reduce market-constraining state interventions with the 
intention of unleashing market-led investment and growth. It has been argued that 
Tanzania’s regulatory framework is one of the most extensive, time-consuming to 
work around and least transparent in Africa (URT, 2003). Since liberalization there 
has been a significant scaling down of government involvement in industrialization, 
mainly with the withdrawal of government from the financial system, extensive 
privatization of parastatals as well as a reduction and rationalization of the tax system 
for the private sector. 
 
These reforms have seen a return to industrial growth after 1995 driven by a number 
of privatized firms in the food and beverages sector as well as by cement, steel and 
tobacco. But other privatized industries including chemicals, petroleum, rubber, 
plastics, paper and wood products have demonstrated negative growth, with weak 
growth in textiles and garments. It is important to note here that the privatized 
manufacturing firms that have done well have a large domestic market and a 
relatively low scale of technology in production. Tanzania has done relatively very 
poorly in exports where quality and productivity are more important, performing 
relatively poorly even in low technology export industries like garments. The problem 
of efficient technology acquisition and technological learning for manufacturing has 
received a much lower priority in the market-led growth strategy. The technological 
support institutions such as the Small Scale Industries Development Organization, the 
Tanzania Industrial Research and Development Organization (TIRDO) and the 
Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS) still exist but their performance has always been 
weak and there has not been sufficient investment or co-ordination to promote their 
effectiveness. The failure to learn how Asian countries used national agencies to 
attract high productivity foreign technologies and create incentives for local producers 
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to start using these technologies remains a big gap in Tanzania’s new economic 
strategy.  
 
As in most developing countries, trade policy has become the central focus of 
industrialization. Liberal economic theory argues that rents hamper exports. For 
instance, rents for selling in domestic markets created by tariffs create disincentives to 
export. Even targeted and specific incentives for exporters such as targeted 
infrastructure or technology licensing strategies can featherbed inefficiency. But in 
fact, the benchmark level playing field that these economic theories assume does not 
exist. Every country including the most advanced has complex national systems of 
subsidies and support for producers ranging from public education systems, health 
systems and infrastructure that developing countries cannot replicate. By definition, 
any attempt to compete with more advanced countries will involve targeted assistance 
because developing countries do not have the public resources to achieve education, 
health and infrastructure provision at a high level through non-targeted approaches. 
Apart from that there are specific problems to do with learning new technologies that 
we have briefly discussed earlier in our discussion of state-constraining corruption 
(see also Khan 2000a). The real problem why many developing countries have fared 
very poorly with catching-up strategies is not that the strategies were irrational and 
irrelevant but rather because they lacked the institutional and political conditions for 
managing these rents. For example, the duty draw-back scheme in Tanzania is 
designed to encourage export promotion through refund of import taxes on imported 
inputs that go towards production for exports. However the scheme is hardly 
operational as there is lack of capacity for timely technical verification on the value of 
inputs consumed by exports resulting in delays in effecting duty refunds (URT; 2003). 
No doubt, there is corruption associated with its implementation as well. The failure 
of this scheme can be used as an argument to get rid of it. However, that will not 
necessarily achieve faster export growth. The conclusion we would draw is to spend a 
small amount of time and resources in improving the capacity of the public 
institutions to implement the strategy (or to design an alternative strategy that is 
cheaper to implement). 
 
Another example from contemporary Tanzania is the Export Processing Zone 
established in 2001 that has the aim of providing subsidized infrastructure for export-
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oriented manufacturing firms. By 2004 only 35% of the space had been rented (URT; 
2004) and significant problems of effective service delivery from the utilities have 
hampered further expansion (personal communication; 2005). The performance of the 
firms located within the EPZ has also been disappointing (Financial Times; 2005) and 
one of the most successful companies exporting under AGOA from the EPZ, Star 
Apparels, closed in 2005 apparently due to an inability to abide by its contractual 
obligations (Tancotton; 2005). We do not see in this experience a justification for 
closing down the EPZ but rather to strengthen institutional and political structures to 
provide targeted infrastructure and utilities more efficiently. Success in these types of 
industrial policy clearly depends on tackling the type of political fragmentation and 
damaging political corruption that resulted in Tanzania achieving one of the highest 
electricity tariffs in Africa. 
 
While a shift to a full-fledged Asian style of industrial policy in Tanzania is 
unrealistic, the establishment of the EPZ as well as the adoption of a Mini-Tiger Plan 
in December 2004 to promote a more active industrialization are significant steps in 
the right direction. Donor policy needs to concentrate on how to support these 
initiatives and improve rent management capacities, starting in relatively 
uncontroversial areas such as agricultural extension, developing effective EPZs and 
technology licensing for moving up the value added chain. In doing these, the priority 
is to address state-constraining corruption in critical agencies that will need to be 
developed, keeping in mind the danger of not attempting to deal with state-
constraining corruption by closing down much of the state. 
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 Appendix 1: List of Interviewees/Discussants Tanzania 
 
Barkan, Joel Political Scientist, University of Iowa 
Bwana, Justice Stephen Head, Commercial Court 
Morin, Denyse Senior Public Sector Adviser, 
Tanzania and Uganda, World Bank 
Mueller, Helga Head, Public Sector Group, 
Africa Region, World Bank 
Mukandala, Prof. Rwekaza Professor, Political Science, University of Dar es 
Salaam 
Okoh, Kwasi Managing Director, Unilever Tanzania 
Titsworth, Jack Governance Adviser, DFID 
Kobb, Dan M & E Adviser, President’s Office 
Public Service Management 
Mushi, Richard Professor of Business, UDsm 
Rajani, Rakesh Head, HakiElimu 
Rutashobya, Lettice Professor of Business, UDsm 
Sundet, Geir Political Scientist, REPOA 
Titsworth, Jack Governance Adviser, DFID 
Wangwe, Sam Public Service Reform – check 
Mmuya, Max Professor, Political Science, University of Dar es 
Salaam 
Tax, Stergomena Head, BEST Programme, Presidents Office Planning 
and Privatization 
Mr Keruzi Head of Research, Tanzania Investment Centre 
Mayaya, Robert Head of Good Governance Coordination Unit, 
Presidents Office 
Shivji, Issa Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Dar es 
Salaam 
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i The previous policy of the British had been to settle new white farmers on land which had belonged to 
Germans, avoiding some of the contentions over Tanganyika’s trust status and reducing direct conflict 
with African farmers (Coulson; 1979). The farmers threatened with dispossession organized 
themselves into the Meru Citizens Union to fight evictions. Through fundraising efforts and 
organizational support of the African Association (the predecessor to TANU) the Union lobbied the 
visiting mission of the Trusteeship Committee before the evictions actually took place and they sent 
representation to the Trusteeship Committee in New York. The issue was taken to the Security Council 
in 1952 and the British agreed to change their policy, causing the British to adopt a cautious non-
confrontational approach with regards to expropriation of land until the end of the colonial period. 
 74
